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Madison v. Alabama 
 
Ruling Below: Madison v. Alabama, CC-1985-001385.80 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2018) 
 
Overview: Madison has been on death row for 30 years and has suffered several serious strokes 
resulting in dementia. Madison’s dementia rendered him unable to remember committing the crime 
for which he is to be executed. 
 
Issue: : 1. Whether, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman, a state may execute a prisoner whose mental 
disability leaves him with no memory of his commission of the capital offense; and 2. Whether 
evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency has been compromised by vascular 
dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a degenerative medical 
condition that prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or 
understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution. 
 
State of Alabama, Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Madison Vernon, Defendants-Appellants 
 
Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama 
 
Decided on January 16, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
Robert H, Smith, Circuit Judge:  
 
ORDER 
 
This Court held a hearing on January 
16, 2018 on Defendant’s petition to suspend 
his execution because he claims he is 
incompetent to be executed pursuant to 
Alabama Code § 15-16-23. The Defendant 
was present and represented by counsel. 
Counsel from the Office of the Attorney 
General were also present for the State of 
Alabama. This Court received argument on 
the issue.  
 
The Defendant did not provide a 
substantial threshold showing of insanity, a 
requirement set out by the United States 
Supreme Court,  
sufficient to convince this Court to stay the 
execution. As a result, this Court hereby 
DENIES Defendant’s petition to stay the 
execution. And the State’s motion to dismiss 
the petition to suspend the execution is 
hereby GRANTED. 
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“Too Old to Be Executed? Supreme Court Considers an Aging Death Row” 
 
 
The New York Times 
 
Adam Liptak 
 
March 5, 2018 
 
The nation’s death rows are starting to look 
like geriatric wards. Condemned inmates in 
many states are more likely to die of natural 
causes than to be executed. The rare ones 
who are put to death often first spend decades 
behind bars, waiting. 
It turns out that executing old men is not easy. 
In November, Ohio called off an attempt to 
execute Alva Campbell, 69, after the 
execution team could not find a suitable vein 
into which to pump lethal chemicals. The 
state announced that it would try again in 
June 2019, by which time he would have 
been 71. 
But Mr. Campbell suffered from what one 
judge called an “extraordinary list of 
ailments.” He used a walker, could barely 
breathe and relied on a colostomy bag. He 
was found lifeless in his cell on Saturday, 
having died in the usual way, without 
government assistance. 
In Alabama last month, state officials called 
off the execution of Doyle Lee Hamm, 61, 
also because they could not find a suitable 
vein. Mr. Hamm has at least two kinds of 
cancer, cranial and lymphatic, and he may not 
have long to live with or without the state’s 
efforts. 
Last week, the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case of another Alabama inmate, 
Vernon Madison, 67, who suffers from 
dementia and cannot remember the crime that 
sent him to death row. The court, which has 
barred the execution of juvenile 
offenders and the intellectually disabled, is 
now turning its attention to old people. 
In 1985, Mr. Madison killed a police officer, 
Julius Schulte, who had been trying to keep 
the peace between Mr. Madison and his ex-
girlfriend, Cheryl Greene, as she sought to 
eject him from what had been their shared 
home. Mr. Madison shot Ms. Greene, too, 
wounding her. 
Mr. Madison remembers none of this. He has 
suffered at least two severe strokes, and he is 
blind and incontinent. His speech is slurred, 
and what he says does not always make 
sense. 
He has asked that his mother be told of his 
strokes, but his mother is dead. He soils 
himself, saying “no one will let me out to use 
the bathroom,” though there is a toilet in his 
cell. He says he plans to move to Florida. He 
can recite the alphabet, but only to the letter 
G. 
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Mr. Madison also insists that he “never went 
around killing folks.” 
A court-appointed psychologist found that 
Mr. Madison had “significant body and 
cognitive decline as a result of strokes.” But 
the psychologist testified that Mr. Madison 
understood what he was accused of and how 
the state planned to punish him. According to 
Steve Marshall, Alabama’s attorney general, 
that is enough. 
The Supreme Court’s precedents bar the 
execution of people who lack a “rational 
understanding” of the reason they are to be 
put to death. 
Mr. Marshall told the justices that Mr. 
Madison satisfied that standard. “The ability 
to form a rational understanding of an event,” 
he wrote in January in a brief urging the 
justices to stay out of the case, “has very 
limited relation to whether a person 
remembers that event.” 
Mr. Madison’s case, which has been 
bouncing around the court system for more 
than 30 years, has taken some unusual turns. 
His first conviction was reversed because 
prosecutors violated the Constitution by 
excluding all seven potential jurors who were 
black. His second conviction was thrown 
out after prosecutors committed misconduct 
by using expert testimony to tell the jury 
about evidence never properly introduced. 
At Mr. Madison’s third trial, the jury voted to 
sentence him to life in prison. But Judge 
Ferrill D. McRae, of Mobile County Circuit 
Court, overrode that verdict and sentenced 
Mr. Madison to death. 
I interviewed Judge McRae in 2011, not long 
before he died. I had sought him out because 
he had achieved a rare distinction. He had 
overridden six jury verdicts calling for life 
sentences, a state record, while never 
rejecting a jury’s recommendation of death. 
Alabama juries are not notably squeamish 
about the death penalty, but Judge McRae 
said they needed to be corrected when they 
were seized by an impulse toward mercy. “If 
you didn’t have something like that,” he said 
of judicial overrides, “a jury with no 
experience in other cases would be making 
the ultimate decision, based on nothing.” 
Alabama abolished judicial overrides last 
year. 
In 2016, Mr. Madison came very close to 
being put to death. A deadlocked eight-
member Supreme Court refused to vacate a 
stay of execution issued by a federal appeals 
court, with the court’s four conservative 
members saying they would have let the 
execution proceed. Justice Antonin Scalia 
had died a few months before, leaving the 
Supreme Court short-handed. Had Justice 
Scalia lived, Mr. Madison would almost 
certainly be dead by now. 
The case took some additional procedural 
twists, and Mr. Madison returned to the 
Supreme Court in January after a state court 
again ruled against him. The Supreme 
Court stayed his execution, though the 
court’s three most conservative members — 
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito 
Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch — said they would 
have let it go forward. 
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The case, Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505, 
will be argued in the fall, and it will give the 
court a chance to consider some profound 
questions. 
“Mr. Madison is one among a growing 
number of aging prisoners who remain on 
death row in this country for ever longer 
periods of time,” Justice Stephen G. Breyer 
wrote in a concurring opinion when the court 
considered an earlier appeal. “Given this 
trend, we may face ever more instances of 
state efforts to execute prisoners suffering the 
diseases and infirmities of old age.” 
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“Supreme Court Stays Execution of Inmate Who Lawyers Say is Not Competent” 
 
 
CNN 
 
Steve Almasy and Mayra Cuevas 
 
January 26, 2018 
 
The US Supreme Court has granted a stay of 
execution for an Alabama inmate whose 
dementia, his lawyers say, prevents him from 
remembering the murder he was convicted of 
committing decades ago. 
Alabama had planned to put Vernon 
Madison, 67, to death on Thursday night, but 
less than a half hour before the execution was 
to take place, Justice Clarence Thomas issued 
a temporary stay. 
 
About two and a half hours later, the high 
court announced that a stay had been granted 
while the court decides what to do with an 
appeal from the defense.  
 
Madison has been convicted three times in 
the shooting of Mobile police Cpl. Julius 
Schulte, who was responding to a April 1985 
domestic disturbance call. Madison, who was 
on parole, sneaked up behind Schulte and 
shot him twice in the head, according to court 
documents. He also shot his girlfriend, who 
survived her wounds. 
 
At his first and second trials, Madison argued 
that he was not guilty because he was 
mentally ill. At his third trial, he argued self-
defense. 
 
His attorneys from the Equal Justice 
Initiative, based in Montgomery, filed a 
petition Wednesday with the Supreme Court. 
Madison's sentence was imposed in 1994 by 
a judge, after a jury recommended life 
without parole. His lawyers argue the death 
sentence is unfair because a 2017 Alabama 
law no longer permits judicial override and 
they say Madison's sentence should be 
commuted to life without parole. 
 
"Given Alabama's rejection of judicial 
override, the death sentence in this case 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and 
violates Mr. Madison's rights to a jury, fair 
and reliable sentencing and to due process 
and equal protection of the laws as 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Alabama law," they wrote 
in their petition. 
 
In prior appeals, Madison's attorneys have 
argued their client doesn't fully understand 
why he is being punished because dementia 
has taken his ability to remember his crime. 
They also say his health is declining. 
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In November, the US Supreme Court agreed 
with a state court ruling that Madison was 
mentally competent. 
 
"The state court did not unreasonably apply 
(two prior decisions) when it determined that 
Madison is competent to be executed because 
-- notwithstanding his memory loss -- he 
recognizes that he will be put to death as 
punishment for the murder he was found to 
have committed," the justices wrote. 
 
Madison's lawyers asked Gov. Kay Ivey for 
clemency. 
 
"Mr. Madison suffers from vascular dementia 
as a result of multiple serious strokes in the 
last several years, and no longer has a 
memory of the commission of the crime for 
which he is to be executed," attorneys wrote. 
 
"He does not understand why the state of 
Alabama is attempting to execute him," they 
said. 
 
They argue that executing someone with 
dementia is counter to how society treats 
vulnerable citizens. 
 
CNN reached out to the governor's office and 
the state's Attorney General's office but didn't 
get a response.  
 
There are 182 inmates on Alabama's death 
row, three of whom have been there longer 
than Madison. 
 
Before his execution was stayed, Madison 
had two oranges for his last meal and did not  
made any statements, officials said. 
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“The Cruelty of Executing the Sick and Elderly: Two controversial cases in 
Alabama reveal a disturbing trend in the death penalty in America.” 
 
 
The New Republic 
 
Matt Ford 
 
February 27, 2018 
 
Vernon Madison doesn’t know why he’s 
going to be executed.  
 
The state of Alabama tells him that he fatally 
shot a police officer in the back and wounded 
his ex-girlfriend during a domestic dispute in 
1985. State courts tossed out his first two 
convictions in the 1980s before a jury found 
him guilty for the third time in 1994. Those 
jurors, who were told of Vernon’s history of 
mental illness, sentenced him to life 
imprisonment without parole. The presiding 
judge then used an esoteric provision of 
Alabama law to sentence Madison to death 
instead. 
 
Now 67 years old, the longtime death-row 
inmate is hardly the same man who was 
convicted of capital murder almost a quarter-
century ago. Multiple strokes have left him 
with vascular dementia, a severe and 
degenerative neurological disease that has 
stripped Madison of his mental functions. He 
can no longer see, walk independently, or 
control his bladder. According to his petition 
for review, a psychologist’s examination 
found that he can no longer remember the 
alphabet past the letter G or name the previous 
president of the United States. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take 
Madison’s case on Monday. But he isn’t the 
only ailing death-row prisoner that Alabama 
wants to execute. Last week, the state tried to 
carry out its death warrant against Doyle 
Hamm, a 61-year-old inmate suffering from 
terminal lymphoma. Hamm’s lawyer Bernard 
Harcourt warned ahead of time that his 
client’s illness, chemotherapy regimen, and 
past history of drug use would make it 
impossible for prison personnel to find a 
suitable vein for a lethal injection. A 
misapplied injection can have horrific 
consequences, as shown by 
Oklahoma’s botched execution of Clayton 
Lockett in 2014. 
 
On the night of his execution last week, the 
prediction came true. Alabama executioners 
struggled to find a workable vein for two and 
a half hours as they punctured him multiple 
times across his arms, legs, and groin. “The IV 
personnel almost certainly punctured Doyle’s 
bladder, because he was urinating blood for 
the next day,” Harcourt told NBC News. 
“They may have hit his femoral artery as well, 
because suddenly there was a lot of blood 
gushing out. There were multiple puncture 
wounds on the ankles, calf, and right groin 
area, around a dozen.” The team eventually 
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gave up, as the execution warrant expired at 
midnight. 
 
Both men are symptomatic of America’s 
aging death rows. In 2013, the latest year with 
available data, the federal Bureau of Justice 
Statistics found that death-row inmates waited 
an average of 15 and a half years between 
conviction and execution. In states that rarely 
perform executions, the sentence is effectively 
life imprisonment with a chance of death. The 
problem isn’t limited to death row, either: 
Thanks to mandatory minimums and decades-
long sentences, the number of American 
inmates over age 55 jumped fourfold between 
1990 and 2010. 
 
The procedural history of Madison’s case 
reads like a travelogue through the death 
penalty’s most persistent flaws. The state 
court of criminal appeals vacated his first 
conviction for the murder in 1986 after 
learning that county prosecutors had struck all 
seven black potential jurors before the trial. 
(Madison is also black.) A second trial in 1990 
also resulted in his conviction, only to be 
tossed out again by the appeals court because 
one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses went 
beyond the factual record. 
 
At his third trial, in 1994, Madison’s lawyers 
highlighted his history of mental illness. A 
psychologist testified for the defense that 
Madison’s symptoms took the form of 
paranoid delusions, which may have lessened 
his culpability when he shot and killed the 
police officer in 1985. After weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
jurors found him guilty of murder and 
sentenced him to life imprisonment without 
parole. 
 
That would have been the end of the legal saga 
in most of the country, at least where the death 
penalty is concerned. But Alabama was one of 
a handful of states that allowed judicial 
overrides in capital cases. (The state abolished 
the practice in 2017, as the Supreme Court’s 
intervention appeared imminent, but didn’t 
apply it retroactively.) Madison’s third trial 
judge was Ferrill McRae, who campaigned for 
his elected post on a tough-on-crime platform 
and often assigned himself the county’s 
capital murder cases. McRae overrode the 
jury and sent Madison to death row. 
 
The Supreme Court has long interpreted the 
Eighth Amendment to forbid executions of 
those who cannot comprehend the 
punishment. In 1986, the justices banned 
executions of prisoners “who have lost their 
sanity” in Ford v. Wainwright, citing 
precedents as far back as Hanoverian England 
that described the practice as “savage and 
inhuman.” The court later ruled in the 2002 
case Atkins v. Virginia that states could also 
no longer execute people with intellectual 
disabilities. In 2007, the justices expanded the 
prohibition in Panetti v. Quarterman to 
require lower courts to consider whether an 
inmate’s mental illness left him unable to 
understand why they were being executed. 
 
“The potential for a prisoner’s recognition of 
the severity of the offense and the objective of 
community vindication are called in 
question,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote 
for the Panetti majority, “if the prisoner’s 
mental state is so distorted by a mental illness 
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that his awareness of the crime and 
punishment has little or no relation to the 
understanding of those concepts shared by the 
community as a whole.” 
 
Madison’s lawyers drew a direct line between 
those rulings and their client’s plight. 
“Since Ford and Panetti, scientific and 
medical advancements have led to a greater 
understanding of how neurocognitive 
disorders manifest in individuals who suffer 
from cognitive decline due to formerly 
undefined reasons,” he argued in their petition 
to the court. “Vernon Madison is one of these 
individuals.” 
In most places across the United States, the 
death penalty is dying out. Fewer 
jurisdictions are pursuing capital 
cases because of the extraordinary costs and 
risk of wrongful convictions. More states 
are stepping back from capital punishment by 
simply not performing executions or 
by abolishing it altogether. But it is not yet 
dead. Until then, those who remain to face the 
executioner’s needle increasingly seem to be 
not the worst of the worst, but rather the sick 
and dying, the aged and infirm, the 
impoverished and the incompetent. 
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“Execution called off for Alabama inmate Vernon Madison” 
 
 
AL.com 
 
Ivana Hrynkiw 
 
January 26, 2018 
 
Vernon Madison, one of the longest serving 
inmates on Alabama's Death Row, was 
scheduled to be executed at 6 p.m. 
Thursday, but 30 minutes before the 
scheduled execution the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued a temporary stay. The stay was 
later granted, and Madison's execution 
called off. 
Madison, 67, has been on death row for over 
30 years after being convicted in April 1985 
of killing Mobile police Cpl. Julius 
Schulte. He was set to die by lethal injection 
at Holman Correctional Facility in Atmore 
Thursday night, but escaped execution for 
the second time via an U.S. Supreme Court 
order issuing a stay. 
Attorney General Steve Marshall issued a 
statement Friday morning in response to the 
U.S. Supreme Court's issuance of the stay. 
"After prior rulings that Vernon Madison is 
competent to face execution for the murder 
of a Mobile police officer 32 years ago - a 
cold blooded crime for which there is no 
doubt he is guilty - it is disappointing that 
justice is again delayed for the victim's 
family," Marshall said.  "The State opposes 
Madison's delay tactics and will continue to 
pursue the execution of his death sentence." 
The U.S. Supreme Court about 30 minutes 
prior to the execution issued a temporary 
stay, then was extended at 8:10 p.m., 
causing the execution to be called off for 
Thursday night. 
The Supreme Court's order states the stay is 
in place until the justices decide whether 
they will grant Madison's writ of certiorari - 
request for a review of the case. Justices 
Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil 
Gorsuch would deny the application for 
stay, the order said.  
If a majority on the U.S. Supreme Court 
refuses to review the case, then the stay will 
automatically be lifted and the Attorney 
General can then request a new execution 
date for Madison from the state supreme 
court. 
In the certiorari request by Madison's 
attorneys at the Equal Justice Initiative 
(EJI), they say Madison is not competent to 
be executed. 
The EJI asks that the U.S. Supreme Court to 
stay his execution and grant his petition for 
certiorari. The court should address the 
"substantial question of whether executing 
Mr. Madison, whose severe cognitive 
dysfunction leaves him without memory of 
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his commission of the capital offense or 
ability to understand the circumstances of 
his scheduled execution, violates evolving 
standards of decency and the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment." 
"It is undisputed that Mr. Madison suffers 
from vascular dementia as a 
result of multiple serious strokes in the last 
two years and no longer has a 
memory of the commission of the crime for 
which he is to be executed," according to the 
EJI request. "His mind and body are failing: 
he suffers from encephalomacia (dead brain 
tissue), small vessel ischemia, speaks in a 
dysarthric or slurred manner, is legally 
blind, can no longer walk independently, 
and has urinary incontinence as a 
consequence of damage to his brain."  
Madison was 34 when he was charged 
Schulte's death, who was responding to a 
domestic disturbance call. Madison also 
was charged with shooting the woman he 
lived with at the time, 37-year-old Cheryl 
Ann Greene. She survived her injuries.  
According to court records filed by 
the Alabama Attorney General, here's a 
police account of what happened that night: 
Madison's neighbor's had called police, and 
Schulte was assigned to protect Greene and 
her 11-year-old daughter as Madison moved 
out of their house. After pretending to leave 
the property, Madison retrieved a pistol, 
crept behind the police car Schulte was 
sitting in, and fired two shots into the back 
of the officer's head. After shooting Schulte, 
Madison then shot Greene as she tried to 
flee. There were three eye witnesses. 
Madison's first trial took place in September 
1985. He was convicted, but a state 
appellate court sent the case back for a 
violation involving race-based jury 
selection. 
His second trial took place in 1990. 
Prosecutors presented a similar case, and 
defense attorneys again argued that 
Madison suffered from a mental illness. 
They did not dispute the fact that Madison 
shot Schulte, but said he did not know that 
Schulte - dressed in plain clothes and 
driving an unmarked police cruiser - was a 
police officer. 
He was again convicted, and a jury 
recommended a death sentence by a 10-2 
vote. An appellate court again sent the case 
back to Mobile County for a retrial, this 
time based on improper testimony from an 
expert witness for the prosecution.  
His third and final trial took place in April 
1994. He was convicted, and the jury 
recommended a life sentence after both 
Madison and his mother, Aldonia 
McMillan, asked for mercy. Mobile County 
Circuit Judge Ferrill McRae sentenced 
Madison to death-- this time overriding the 
jury's recommendation. 
In April 2017, Gov. Kay Ivey signed into 
law a bill that says juries, not judges, have 
the final say on whether to impose the death 
penalty. That law officially ended 
Alabama's judicial override policy, as 
Alabama was the last state to allow it.  
Late Wednesday, Madison's attorneys filed 
two more petitions to the U.S. Supreme 
Court-- an application for a stay of 
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execution, and a petition for a writ of 
certiorari focused on the issue of judicial 
override. Madison's attorneys argued that 
since he was sent to death under the judicial 
override statue, he is entitled to a stay and a 
review of his case. Attorneys filed similar 
motions to the Alabama Supreme Court, but 
they denied the request earlier Wednesday. 
"Because a death sentence is no longer 
permissible in cases where the jury has 
returned a sentence of life, Mr. Madison 
filed a challenge to his death sentence and 
scheduled execution in the Alabama 
Supreme Court. He contended that this 
execution would be arbitrary and capricious 
and constitute a violation of the Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment," the 
petition states. "The judicial override in this 
case resulted in a death sentence that is 
arbitrary, disproportionate, and 
unconstitutional..." 
The Alabama Attorney General's Office, 
which opposes a delay, said in a Thursday 
response that Madison's attorneys waited 
too late to file their appeal based on the 
judicial override issue. "Madison's 
inequitable conduct in delaying the filing of 
his most recent legal claim until the day 
before his scheduled execution should be 
sufficient to warrant denial of the requested 
stay of execution," the attorney general's 
office stated in its brief to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.   
Madison was first scheduled to be executed 
by lethal injection in May 2016, but there 
was a temporary delay. Hours after that 
execution's scheduled time, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued a ruling upholding an 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals stay of 
execution. The AG's Office filed responses 
in opposition to those petitions.  
In November 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed that decision, paving 
the way for Madison to be executed. 
Last month, Madison's attorneys from the 
Equal Justice Initiative filed a petition in 
Mobile County court to stay Madison's 
execution, but after a hearing the judge in 
that case denied the request for a stay of 
execution. Bryan Stevenson, founder of the 
EJI and one of Madison's attorneys, then 
filed two new petitions to the U.S. Supreme 
Court: One for a stay of execution, and one 
asking the court to review the case. The 
AG's Office also filed responses to those 
requests. 
Alabama Department of Corrections 
spokesperson Bob Horton said Madison was 
visited yesterday by his sister, two friends, 
two attorneys, and a minister. Today, he was 
visited by his brother, attorney, and a 
minister. 
Horton said in the past day, Madison has 
made phone calls to several attorneys, his 
daughter-in-law, several friends, and his 
spiritual advisor. His last phone call was at 
8:25 p.m. yesterday to his daughter-in-law.  
Thursday morning, Madison had breakfast 
of orange juice, eggs, two biscuits, jelly, 
grits, and prunes. His last meal was two 
oranges. He had no other special requests. 
No family from either the victim's family or 
Madison's family were to witness the 
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execution. One of Madison's attorneys was 
to be present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bucklew v. Precythe 
 
Ruling Below: Bucklew v. Precythe, 885 F.3d 527 (8th Cir. 2018) 
 
Overview: Bucklew was convicted of murder, kidnapping, and rape. Bucklew is set to be 
executed, but he has a medical condition that would be exacerbated by lethal injection making his 
death extremely painful. 
 
Issue: (1) Whether a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution 
based on an inmate’s rare and severe medical condition should assume that medical personnel are 
competent to manage his condition and that procedure will go as intended; (2) whether evidence 
comparing a state’s method of execution with an alternative proposed by an inmate must be offered 
via a single witness, or whether a court at summary judgment must look to the record as a whole 
to determine whether a factfinder could conclude that the two methods significantly differ in the 
risks they pose to the inmate; (3) whether the Eighth Amendment requires an inmate to prove an 
adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s 
proposed method of execution based on his rare and severe medical condition; and (4) whether 
petitioner Russell Bucklew met his burden under Glossip v. Gross to prove what procedures would 
be used to administer his proposed alternative method of execution, the severity and duration of 
pain likely to be produced, and how they compare to the state’s method of execution. 
 
Russell Bucklew Appellant 
v. 
Anne L. Precythe, Director of the Department of Corrections, et al. Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit 
 
Decided on March 15, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
ORDER 
Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, 
LOKEN, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, 
SHEPHERD, KELLY, ERICKSON, 
GRASZ and STRAS, Circuit Judges 
 
Appellant Bucklew’s petition for 
rehearing by panel is denied. Judge Colloton 
would grant the petition for rehearing by 
panel. 
 
Appellant Bucklew’s petition for 
rehearing en banc has been considered by the 
court and the petition is denied. Chief Judge 
Smith and Judge Kelly would grant the 
petition. Judge Colloton and Judge Gruender 
would grant rehearing en banc on Point I of 
the petition for rehearing en banc. 
 
 Judge Duane Benton took no part in 
the consideration or decision of the petition 
for rehearing en banc.  
 
KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc. 
 
I would grant Russell Bucklew’s 
petition for rehearing en banc—and reverse 
the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment—for the reasons stated in the 
dissent from the panel opinion in this case. 
See Bucklew v. Precythe, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 
WL 1163360, at *7 (8th Cir. 2018) (Colloton, 
J., dissenting). I would also grant Bucklew’s 
petition to the extent it seeks reconsideration 
of this court’s conclusion, in Bucklew v. 
Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 
2015) (en banc), that those sentenced to death 
must plead a “feasible, readily implemented 
alternative procedure” for carrying out their 
sentence in order to state a plausible as-
applied claim under the Eighth Amendment. 
I continue to believe that “[f]acial and as-
applied challenges to execution protocols are 
different,” that death row inmates “need not 
plead a readily available alternative method 
of execution” to bring an as-applied 
challenge, and that “[a] state cannot be 
excused from taking into account a particular 
inmate’s existing physical disability or health 
condition when assessing the propriety of its 
execution method.” See id. at 1129 (Bye, J., 
concurring in the result). “While the Supreme 
Court has been clear on the general 
proposition that, so long as a state-imposed 
death penalty is constitutional, there must be 
some way for states to carry out executions, 
the Supreme Court has also been clear that 
some individuals cannot be executed.” Id. at 
1130 (collecting cases); see also Madison v. 
Alabama, 138 S. Ct. ___, 2018 WL 514241 
(Feb. 26, 2018); Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 
9, 12 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In my 
view, neither Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 
2726 (2015), nor any subsequent case from 
the United States Supreme Court dictates the 
result this court reached on this issue in 
Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge  
The issue is whether the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as applied, bar 
Missouri officials from employing a 
procedure that is authorized by Missouri 
statute to execute Russell Bucklew.  
In March 2006, Bucklew stole a car; 
armed himself with pistols, handcuffs, and a 
roll of duct tape; and followed his former 
girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the home of 
Michael Sanders, where she was living. 
Bucklew knocked and entered the trailer with 
a pistol in each hand when Sanders’s son 
opened the door. Sanders took the children to 
the back room and grabbed a shotgun. 
Bucklew began shooting. Two bullets struck 
Sanders, one piercing his chest. Bucklew 
fired at Sanders’s six-year- old son, but 
missed. As Sanders bled to death, Bucklew 
struck Ray in the face with a pistol, 
handcuffed Ray, dragged her to the stolen 
car, drove away, and raped Ray in the back 
seat of the car. He was apprehended by the 
highway patrol after a gun- fight in which 
Bucklew and a trooper were wounded.  
A Missouri state court jury convicted 
Bucklew of murder, kidnaping, and rape. The 
trial court sentenced Bucklew to death, as the 
jury had recommended. His conviction and 
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. 
State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 
1998). The trial court denied his petition for 
post-conviction relief, and the Supreme 
Court of Missouri again affirmed. Bucklew v. 
State, 38 S.W.3d 395 (Mo. banc 2001). We 
subsequently affirmed the district court’s 
denial of Bucklew’s petition for a federal writ 
of habeas corpus. Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 
F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). The Supreme 
Court of Missouri issued a writ of execution 
for May 21, 2014. Bucklew filed this action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 
execution by Missouri’s lethal injection 
protocol, authorized by statute, would 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as applied to him because of his 
unique medical condition. Bucklew appeals 
the district court’s 1 grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the state defendants 
because Bucklew failed to present adequate 
evidence to establish his claim under the 
governing standard established by the 
Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 
128 S.Ct. 1520, 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008), and 
Glossip v. Gross, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 
2726, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015). Reviewing 
the grant of summary judgment de novo, we 
affirm.  
 I. 
[1] Missouri’s method of execution is 
by injection of a lethal dose of the drug 
pentobarbital. Two days before his scheduled 
execution in 2014, the district court denied 
Bucklew’s motion for a stay of execution and 
dismissed this as-applied action sua sponte. 
On appeal, a divided panel granted a stay of 
execution, Bucklew v. Lombardi, 565 
Fed.Appx. 562 (8th Cir. 2014); the court en 
banc vacated the stay. Bucklew applied to the 
Supreme Court for a stay of execution, and 
the Court issued an Order granting his 
application ‘‘for stay pending appeal in the 
Eighth Circuit.’’ This court, acting en banc, 
reversed the sua sponte dismissal of 
Bucklew’s as-applied Eighth Amendment 
claim and remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. Bucklew v. Lombardi, 
783 F.3d 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(‘‘Bucklew I’’). On the same day, the en banc 
court affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
on the merits of a facial challenge to 
Missouri’s lethal injection protocol filed by 
several inmates sentenced to death, including 
Bucklew. Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 
1114 (8th Cir.), cert denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 
135 S.Ct. 2941, 192 L.Ed.2d 976 (2015).  
Our decision in Bucklew I set forth in 
considerable detail the allegations in 
Bucklew’s as-applied complaint regarding 
his medical condition. 783 F.3d at 1124-26. 
Bucklew has long suffered from a congenital 
condition called cavernous hemangioma, 
which causes clumps of weak, malformed 
blood vessels and tumors to grow in his face, 
head, neck, and throat. The large, inoperable 
tumors fill with blood, periodically rupture, 
and partially obstruct his airway. In addition, 
the condition affects his circulatory system, 
and he has compromised peripheral veins in 
his hands and arms. In his motion for a stay 
of execution in Bucklew I, Bucklew argued:  
Dr. Joel Zivot, a board-certified 
anesthesinologist . . . concluded after 
reviewing Mr. Bucklew’s medical 
records that a substantial risk existed 
that, because of Mr. Bucklew’s 
vascular malformation, the lethal 
drug will likely not circulate as 
intended, creating a substantial risk of 
a ‘‘prolonged and extremely painful 
execution.’’ Dr. Zivot also concluded 
that a very substantial risk existed that 
Mr. Bucklew would hemorrhage 
during the execution, potentially 
choking on his own blood—a risk 
greatly heightened by Mr. Bucklew’s 
partially obstructed airway.  
 
*    *    *    *    * 
[The Department of Corrections has 
advised it would not use a dye in 
flushing the intravenous line because 
Dr. Zivot warned that might cause a 
spike in Bucklew’s blood pressure.] 
Reactionary changes at the eleventh 
hour, without the guidance of 
imaging or tests, create a substantial 
risk to Mr. Bucklew, who suffers 
from a complex and severe medical 
condition that has compromised his 
veins.  
*    *    *    *    * 
 
The DOC seems to acknowledge they 
agree with Dr. Zivot that Mr. 
 Bucklew’s obstructed airway 
presents substantial risks of needless 
pain and suffering, but what they plan 
to do about it is a mystery. Will they 
execute Mr. Bucklew in a seated 
position? . . .  The DOC should be 
required to disclose how it plans to 
execute Mr. Bucklew so that this 
Court can properly assess whether 
additional risks are present. TTT 
Until Mr. Bucklew knows what 
protocol the DOC will use to kill him, 
and until the DOC is required to 
conduct the necessary imaging and 
testing to quantify the expansion of 
Mr. Bucklew’s hemangiomas and the 
extent of his airway obstruction, it is 
not possible to execute him without 
substantial risk of severe pain and 
needless suffering. 
 
Defendants’ Suggestions in 
Opposition argued that Bucklew’s 
‘‘proposed changes . . . with the exception of 
his complaint about [dye], which Missouri 
will not use in Bucklew’s execution, are not 
really changes in the method of execution.’’  
[2, 3] Glossip and Baze established 
two requirements for an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to a method of execution. First, the 
challenger must ‘‘establish that the method 
presents a risk that is sure or very likely to 
cause serious illness and needless suffering, 
and give rise to sufficiently imminent 
dangers.’’ Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737 
(emphasis in original), citing Baze, 553 U.S. 
at 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520. This evidence must 
show that the pain and suffering being risked 
is severe in relation to the pain and suffering 
that is accepted as inherent in any method of 
execution. Id. at 2733. Second, the challenger 
must ‘‘identify an alternative that is feasible, 
readily implemented, and in fact significantly 
reduces a substantial risk of severe pain.’’ 
Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737, citing Baze, 553 
U.S. at 52, 128 S.Ct. 1520. This two-part 
standard governs as-applied as well as facial 
challenges to a method of execution. See, 
e.g., Jones v. Kelley, 854 F.3d 1009, 1013, 
1016 (8th Cir. 2017); Williams v. Kelley, 854 
F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2017); Johnson v. 
Lombardi, 809 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Bucklew I, 783 F.3d at 1123, 1127. As a panel 
we are bound by these controlling precedents. 
Bucklew argues the second Baze/Glossip 
requirement of a feasible alternative method 
of execution that substantially reduces the 
risk of suffering should not apply to ‘‘an 
individual who is simply too sick and 
anomalous to execute in a constitutional 
manner,’’ like those who may not be 
executed for mental health reasons. See, e.g., 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 
S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). The 
Supreme Court has not recognized a 
categorical exemption from the death penalty 
for individuals with physical ailments or 
disabilities. Thus, in the decision on appeal, 
the district court properly applied the 
Baze/Glossip two-part standard in dismissing 
Bucklew’s as-applied claim.  
We concluded in Bucklew I, based on 
a record ‘‘which went well beyond the four 
corners of Bucklew’s complaint,’’ that the 
complaint’s allegations, bolstered by 
defendants’ concession ‘‘that the 
Department’s lethal injection procedure 
would be changed on account of his condition 
by eliminating the use of methylene blue 
dye,’’ sufficiently alleged the first 
 requirement of an as-applied challenge to the 
method of execution—‘‘a substantial risk of 
serious and imminent harm that is sure or 
very likely to occur.’’ 783 F.3d at 1127. We 
further concluded the district court’s sua 
sponte dismissal was premature because 
these detailed allegations made it 
inappropriate ‘‘to assume that Bucklew 
would decline an invitation to amend the as-
applied challenge’’ to plausibly allege a 
feasible and more humane alternative method 
of execution, the second requirement under 
the Baze/Glossip standard. Id. In remanding, 
we directed that further proceedings ‘‘be 
narrowly tailored and expeditiously 
conducted to address only those issues that 
are essential to resolving’’ the as- applied 
challenge. Id. at 1128. We explained:  
Bucklew’s arguments on appeal raise 
an inference that he is impermissibly 
seeking merely to investigate the 
protocol without taking a position as 
to what is needed to fix it. He may not 
be ‘‘permitted to supervise every step 
of the execution process.’’ Rather, at 
the earliest possible time, he must 
identify a feasible, readily 
implemented alternative procedure 
that will significantly reduce a 
substantial risk of severe pain and that 
the State refuses to adopt. . . . Any 
assertion that all methods of 
execution are unconstitutional does 
not state a plausible claim under the 
Eighth Amendment or a cognizable 
claim under § 1983.  
Id. (quotation omitted; emphasis in original).  
II. 
On remand, consistent with our 
directive, the district court first ordered 
Bucklew to file an amended complaint that 
adequately identified an alternative 
procedure. Twice, Bucklew filed amended 
complaints that failed to comply with this 
order. Given one last chance to comply or 
face dismissal, on October 13, 2015, 
Bucklew filed a Fourth Amended Complaint. 
As relevant here, it alleged:  
106. Based on Mr. Bucklew’s unique 
and severe condition, there is no way 
to proceed with Mr. Bucklew’s 
execution under Missouri’s lethal 
injection protocol without a 
substantial risk to Mr. Bucklew of 
suffering grave adverse events during 
the execution, including 
hemorrhaging, suffocating or 
experiencing excruciating pain.  
107. Under any scenario or with any 
of lethal drug, execution by lethal 
injection poses an enormous risk that 
Mr. Bucklew will suffer extreme, 
excruciating and prolonged pain—all 
accompanied by choking and 
struggling for air.  
128. In May 2014, the DOC also 
proposed a second adjustment in its 
protocol, offering to adjust the gurney 
so that Mr. Bucklew is not lying 
completely prone. . . . As a practical 
matter, no adjustment would likely be 
sufficient, as the stress of the 
execution may unavoidably cause Mr. 
Bucklew’s hemangiomas to rupture, 
leading to hemorrhaging, bleeding in 
his throat and through his facial 
 orifices, and coughing and choking 
on his own blood.  
129. In order to fully evaluate and 
establish the risks to Mr. Bucklew 
from execution by lethal injection, a 
full and complete set of imaging 
studies must be conducted.  
139. Mr. Bucklew is mindful of the 
Court’s directive to allege a feasible, 
readily implemented alternative 
procedure . . . Mr. Bucklew has 
complied . . . by researching and 
proposing execution by lethal gas, 
which is specifically authorized by 
Missouri law and which Missouri’s 
Attorney General has stated the DOC 
is prepared to implement.  
150. In adherence with the pleading 
requirements set forth in Glossip, and 
as stated above, Mr. Bucklew 
specifically alleges lethal gas as a 
feasible and available alternative 
method that will significantly reduce 
the risk of severe pain to Mr. 
Bucklew.  
In other words, Bucklew took the 
position that no modification of Missouri’s 
lethal injection method of execution could be 
constitutionally applied to execute Bucklew. 
He proposed massive discovery allegedly 
needed to establish the first Baze/Glossip 
requirement. But his legal theory is that 
alternative procedures such as adjusting the 
gurney’s position are irrelevant because no 
lethal injection procedure would be 
constitutional, only a change to the use of 
lethal gas would be adequate.  
Bucklew’s as-applied claim focused 
on two aspects of his medical condition. First, 
Bucklew’s experts initially opined that his 
peripheral veins are so weak that injection of 
a lethal dose of pentobarbital would not 
adequately circulate, leading to a prolonged 
and painful execution. The district court 
concluded that discovery and expert opinions 
developed on remand refuted this claim. The 
lethal injection protocol provides that 
medical personnel may insert the primary 
intravenous (IV) line ‘‘as a central venous 
line’’ and may dispense with a secondary 
peripheral IV line if ‘‘the prisoner’s physical 
condition makes it unduly difficult to insert 
more than one IV.’’ Bucklew’s expert Dr. 
Zivot conceded, and Defendants’ expert, Dr. 
Joseph Antognini, agreed, that the central 
femoral vein can circulate a ‘‘fair amount of 
fluid’’ without serious risk of rupture and that 
Bucklew’s medical condition will not affect 
the flow of pentobarbital after it is injected 
through this vein.  
Second, Bucklew’s experts opined 
that his condition will cause him to 
experience severe choking and suffocation 
during execution by lethal injection. When 
Bucklew is supine, gravity pulls the 
hemangioma tumor into his throat which 
causes his breathing to be labored and the 
tumor to rupture and bleed. When conscious, 
Bucklew can ‘‘adjust’’ his breathing with 
repeated swallowing that prevents the tumor 
from blocking his airway. But during the 
‘‘twilight stage’’ of a lethal injection 
execution, Dr. Zivot opined that Bucklew 
will be aware he is choking on his own blood 
and in pain before the pentobarbital renders 
him unconscious and unaware of pain. Based 
on a study of lethal injections in horses, Dr. 
 Zivot estimated there could be a period as 
short as 52 seconds and as long as 240 
seconds when Bucklew is conscious but 
immobile and unable to adjust his breathing; 
his attempts to breath will create friction, 
causing the tumor to bleed and possibly 
hemorrhage. In Dr. Zivot’s opinion, there is a 
‘‘very, very high likelihood’’ that Bucklew 
will suffer ‘‘choking complications, 
including visible hemorrhaging,’’ if he is 
executed by any means of lethal injection, 
including using the drug pentobarbital.  
According to Defendants’ expert, Dr. 
Antognini, pentobarbital causes death by 
‘‘producing rapid, deep unconscious[ness], 
respiratory depression, followed by TTT 
complete absence of respiration, decreased 
oxygen levels, slowing of the heart, and then 
the heart stopping.’’ In contrast to Dr. Zivot, 
Dr. Antognini opined that pentobarbital 
would cause ‘‘rapid and deep 
unconsciousness’’ within 20-30 seconds of 
entering Bucklew’s blood stream, rendering 
him insensate to bleeding and choking 
sensations. Dr. Antognini also challenged Dr. 
Zivot’s opinion that a supine Bucklew, 
unable to adjust his breathing, will be aware 
he is choking on his own blood and in pain 
from the tumor blocking his airway before 
the pentobarbital renders him unconscious. 
Dr. Antognini noted that, between 2000 and 
2003, Bucklew underwent general anesthesia 
eight times, at least once in a supine position. 
In December 2016, Bucklew lay supine for 
over an hour undergoing an MRI, with no 
more than discomfort. The MRI revealed that 
his tumor had slightly shrunk since 2010.  
In granting defendants summary 
judgment, the district court declined to rely 
on the first Glossip/Baze requirement 
because these conflicting expert opinions 
‘‘would permit a factfinder to conclude that 
for as long as four minutes [after the injection 
of pentobarbital Bucklew] could be aware 
that he is choking or unable to breathe but be 
unable [to] ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy 
the situation.’’ Rather, the court held that 
Bucklew failed to provide adequate evidence 
that his alternative method of execution—
lethal gas—was a ‘‘feasible, readily 
implemented’’ alternative that would ‘‘in fact 
significantly reduce a substantial risk of 
severe pain’’ as compared to lethal injection. 
Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2737; Baze, 553 U.S. at 
52, 128 S.Ct. 1520.  
III. 
To succeed in his challenge to 
Missouri’s lethal injection execution 
protocol, Bucklew must establish both 
prongs of the Glossip/Baze standard. Glossip, 
135 S. Ct. at 2737. The district court held that 
Bucklew failed to establish the second prong 
of Glossip/Baze by showing that an 
alternative method of execution would ‘‘in 
fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of 
severe pain.’’ As noted, Bucklew argues the 
Glossip/Baze standard should not apply to an 
as-applied challenge to a method of 
execution, an argument our controlling 
precedents have rejected. He raises two 
additional issues on appeal.  
[4] A. Bucklew first argues the 
district court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the second Glossip/Baze 
requirement because he presented sufficient 
evidence that his proposed alternative 
method of execution—death through 
 nitrogen gas-induced hypoxia—‘‘would 
substantially reduce his suffering.’’ 
Summary judgment is not appropriate when 
there are material issues of disputed fact, and 
the Supreme Court in Glossip made clear that 
this issue may require findings of fact that are 
reviewed for clear error. See 135 S.Ct. at 
2739-41 (majority opinion) and 2786 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However, 
whether a method of execution ‘‘constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment is a question of 
law.’’ Swindler v. Lockhart, 885 F.2d 1342, 
1350 (8th Cir. 1989). Thus, unless there are 
material underlying issues of disputed fact, it 
is appropriate to resolve this ultimate issue of 
law by summary judgment.  
[5] Nitrogen hypoxia is an authorized 
method of execution under Missouri Law. 
See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 546.720. Missouri has 
not used this method of execution since 1965 
and does not currently have a protocol in 
place for execution by lethal gas. But there 
are ongoing studies of the method in other 
States and at least preliminary indications 
that Missouri will undertake to develop a 
protocol. Defendants do not argue this is not 
a feasible and available alternative.  
The district court granted summary 
judgment based on Bucklew’s failure to 
provide adequate evidence that execution by 
nitrogen hypoxia would substantially reduce 
the risk of pain or suffering. The court 
allowed Bucklew extensive discovery into 
defendants’ knowledge regarding execution 
by lethal gas. But Missouri’s lack of recent 
experience meant that this discovery 
produced little relevant evidence and no 
evidence that the risk posed by lethal 
injection is substantial when compared to the 
risk posed by lethal gas. See Glossip, 135 
S.Ct. at 2738; Johnson, 809 F.3d at 391. 
Bucklew’s theory is that execution by 
nitrogen hypoxia would render Bucklew 
insensate more quickly than lethal injection 
and would not cause choking and bleeding in 
his tumor-blocked airway. But his expert, Dr. 
Zivot, provided no support for this theory. 
Dr. Zivot’s Supplemental Expert Report 
explained:  
[W]hile I can assess Mr. Bucklew’s 
current medical status and render an 
expert opinion as to the documented 
and significant risks associated with 
executing Mr. Bucklew under 
Missouri’s current Execution 
Procedure, I cannot advise counsel or 
the Court on how to execute Mr. 
Bucklew in a way that would satisfy 
Constitutional requirements.  
Lacking affirmative comparative 
evidence, Bucklew relied on Dr. Antognini’s 
deposition. In his Expert Report, Dr. 
Antognini concluded that ‘‘the use of lethal 
gas would not significantly lessen any 
suffering or be less painful than lethal 
injection in this inmate.’’ At his deposition, 
Dr. Antognini was asked:  
Q. Why does lethal gas not hold any 
advantage compared to lethal injection.  
A. Well . . . there are a lot of types of gases 
that could be used . . . [U]sing gas would not 
significantly lessen any suffering or be less 
painful. Because, again, their onset of action 
is going to be relatively fast, just like 
Pentobarbital’s onset—onset of action. 
  
Q. That’s it? Simply because it would happen 
quickly? 
 A. Correct.  
The district court concluded this opinion 
provided nothing to compare:  
Dr. Antognini specifically stated that 
he believed there would be no 
difference in the ‘‘speed’’ of lethal 
gas as compared to pentobarbital. . . .  
In the absence of evidence 
contradicting Defendants’ expert and 
supporting Plaintiff’s theory, there is 
not a triable issue.  
On appeal, Bucklew argues the 
district court should have compared Dr. 
Zivot’s opinion that lethal injection would 
take up to four minutes to cause Bucklew’s 
brain death with Dr. Antognini’s testimony 
that lethal gas would render him unconscious 
in the same amount of time as lethal injection, 
20 to 30 seconds. But Dr. Antognini’s 
comparative testimony was that both 
methods would result in unconsciousness in 
approximately the same amount of time. 
Bucklew offered no contrary comparative 
evidence and thus the district court correctly 
concluded that he failed to satisfy his burden 
to provide evidence ‘‘establishing a known 
and available alternative that would 
significantly reduce a substantial risk of 
severe pain.’’ McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 
F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2017).  
In addition, Bucklew’s claim that he 
will experience choking sensations during an 
execution by lethal injection but not by 
nitrogen hypoxia rests on the proposition that 
he could be seated during the latter but not the 
former. He argues there is evidence he will be 
forced to remain supine during an execution 
by lethal injection, when his tumor will cause 
him to sense he is choking on his own blood, 
whereas he could remain seated during the 
administration of lethal gas, which would not 
cause a choking sensation. But this argument 
lacks factual support in the record. Having 
taken the position that any lethal injection 
procedure would violate the Eighth 
Amendment, Bucklew made no effort to 
determine what changes, if any, the DOC 
would make in applying its lethal injection 
protocol in executing Bucklew, other than 
defendants advising—prior to remand by this 
court—that dye would not be used.  
Based on Bucklew’s argument to the 
en banc court, we expected that the core of 
the proceedings on remand would be defining 
what changes defendants would make on 
account of Bucklew’s medical condition and 
then evaluating that modified procedure 
under the two-part Baze/Glossip standard. On 
remand, Director of Corrections Ann 
Precythe testified that the medical members 
of the execution team are provided a 
prisoner’s medical history in preparing for 
the execution. Precythe has authority to make 
changes in the execution protocol, such as 
how the primary IV line will be inserted in 
the central femoral vein or how the gurney 
will be positioned, if the team advises that 
changes are needed. While Bucklew sought 
and was denied discovery of the identities of 
the execution team’s medical members, he 
never urged the district court to establish a 
suitable fact-finding procedure—for 
example, by anonymous interrogatories or 
 written deposition questions to the execution 
team members—for discovery of facts 
needed for the DOC to define the as-applied 
lethal injection protocol it intends to use for 
Bucklew. As Bucklew did not pursue these 
issues, the pleadings established that 
defendants have proposed to reposition the 
gurney during Bucklew’s deposition, and 
Director Precythe testified that she has 
authority to make this type of change in the 
execution protocol based on the execution 
team’s advice based on review of Bucklew’s 
medical history, but the record does not 
disclose whether Bucklew will in fact be 
supine during the execution, nor does it 
disclose that a ‘‘cut-down’’ procedure will 
not be used to place the primary IV line in his 
central femoral vein, a procedure Dr. 
Antognini opined was unnecessary. Bucklew 
simply asserts that, in comparing execution 
by lethal injection and by lethal gas, we must 
accept his speculation that defendants will 
employ these risk- increasing procedures. 
This we will not do.  
[6] Like the district court, we 
conclude the summary judgment record 
contains no basis to conclude that Bucklew’s 
risk of severe pain would be substantially 
reduced by use of nitrogen hypoxia instead of 
lethal injection as the method of execution. 
Evidence that ‘‘is equivocal, lacks scientific 
consensus and presents a paucity of reliable 
scientific evidence’’ does not establish that 
an execution is sure or very likely to cause 
serious illness and needless suffering. 
Williams v. Kelley, 854 F.3d at 1001 
(quotation omitted). Therefore, he failed to 
establish the second prong of the 
Glossip/Baze standard.  
[7] B. Bucklew further contends the 
district court erred in denying his requests for 
discovery relating to ‘‘M2’’ and ‘‘M3,’’ two 
members of the lethal injection execution 
team. Bucklew argues he was entitled to 
discovery of the medical technicians’ 
qualifications, training, and experience 
because it would ‘‘illuminate the nature and 
extent of the risks of suffering he faces.’’ For 
example, if M3 was not qualified to safely 
place his IV in the central femoral vein, this 
would directly impact the risk of pain and 
suffering. We review a district court’s 
discovery rulings narrowly and with great 
deference and will reverse only for a ‘‘gross 
abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental 
unfairness.’’ Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 
896, 903 (8th Cir. 2010).  
[8–10] Bucklew’s argument proceeds 
from the premise that M2 and M3 may not be 
qualified for the positions for which they 
have been hired. But we will not assume that 
Missouri employs personnel who are 
incompetent or unqualified to perform their 
assigned duties. See Clemons v. Crawford, 
585 F.3d 1119, 1128 (8th Cir. 2009). He 
further argues that deposition of M2 and M3 
is necessary to understand how they will 
handle a circumstance in case something 
goes wrong during Bucklew’s execution. The 
potentiality that something may go wrong in 
an execution does not give rise to an Eighth 
Amendment violation. Zink, 783 F.3d at 
1101. ‘‘Some risk of pain is inherent in any 
method of execution—no matter how 
humane— if only from the prospect of error 
in following the required procedure. . . .  [A]n 
isolated mishap alone does not give rise to an 
Eighth Amendment violation.’’ Baze, 553 
U.S. at 47, 50, 128 S.Ct. 1520. Thus, the 
 district court’s ruling was consistent with our 
instruction in remanding that Bucklew ‘‘may 
not be permitted to supervise every step of the 
execution process.’’ Bucklew I, 783 F.3d at 
1128 (quotation omitted). The Baze/Glossip 
evaluation must be based on the as-applied 
pre-execution protocol, assuming that those 
responsible for carrying out the sentence are 
competent and qualified to do so, and that the 
procedure will go as intended.  
III. Conclusion 
Having thoroughly reviewed the 
record, we conclude that Bucklew has failed 
to establish that lethal injection, as applied to 
him, constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Therefore, we affirm the 
judgment of the district court.  
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
Russell Bucklew alleges that the State 
of Missouri’s method of execution by lethal 
injection violates his rights under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks an 
injunction prohibiting an execution by that 
method. The district court granted summary 
judgment for the State, but there are genuine 
disputes of material fact that require findings 
of fact by the district court before this dispute 
can be resolved. I would therefore remand the 
case for the district court promptly to conduct 
further proceedings.  
Bucklew’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 requires him to prove two elements: (1) 
that the State’s method of execution is sure or 
very likely to cause him severe pain, and (2) 
that an alternative method of execution that is 
feasible and readily implemented would 
significantly reduce the substantial risk of 
severe pain. Glossip v. Gross, ––– U.S. ––––
, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2737, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 
(2015); Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 
1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc). On the 
first element, the district court concluded that 
taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Bucklew, there is a substantial 
risk under Missouri’s lethal injection 
protocol that Bucklew will experience 
choking and an inability to breathe for up to 
four minutes. On the second element, 
however, the court ruled as a matter of law 
that Bucklew’s suggested alternative 
method—execution by administration of 
nitrogen gas—would not significantly reduce 
the substantial risk that the court identified 
under the first element. In my view, the 
district court’s reasoning as to the first 
element is inconsistent with its summary 
disposition of Bucklew’s claim on the 
second.  
On the first element, Bucklew’s 
theory is that he will suffer severe pain by 
prolonged choking or suffocation if the State 
executes him by lethal injection. He contends 
that when he lies supine on the execution 
gurney, tumors in his throat will block his 
airway unless he can ‘‘adjust’’ his 
positioning to enable breathing. Bucklew 
argues that if an injection of pentobarbital 
renders him unable to adjust his positioning 
while he can still sense pain, then he will 
choke or suffocate.  
In assessing that claim, the district 
court cited conflicting expert testimony from 
Bucklew’s expert, Dr. Joel Zivot, and the 
State’s expert, Dr. Joseph Antognini. Dr. 
 Antognini testified that if the State proceeded 
by way of lethal injection using 
pentobarbital, then Bucklew would be 
unconscious within twenty to thirty seconds 
and incapable of experiencing pain at that 
point. R. Doc. 182-5, at 10, 40-41. Dr. Zivot, 
however, differed: ‘‘I strongly disagree with 
Dr. Antognini’s repeated claim that the 
pentobarbital injection would result in ‘rapid 
unconsciousness’ and therefore Mr. Bucklew 
would not experience any suffocating or 
choking.’’ R. Doc. 182-1, at 147. Zivot 
opined that Bucklew ‘‘would likely 
experience unconsciousness that sets in 
progressively as the chemical circulates 
through his system,’’ and that ‘‘during this 
in-between twilight stage,’’ Bucklew ‘‘is 
likely to experience prolonged feelings of 
suffocation and excruciating pain.’’ Id.  
In his deposition, Dr. Zivot opined 
that ‘‘there will be points,’’ before Bucklew 
dies, ‘‘where he’s beginning to experience 
the effects of the pentobarbital, where his 
ability to control and regulate and adjust his 
airway will be impaired, although there will 
still be the experience capable of knowing 
that he cannot make the adjustment, and will 
experience it as choking.’’ Id. at 81. When 
directed to Dr. Antognini’s opinion that 
Bucklew would be unaware of noxious 
stimuli within twenty to thirty seconds of a 
pentobarbital injection, Dr. Zivot observed 
that Antognini’s opinion was based on a 
study involving dogs from fifty years ago and 
testified that his ‘‘number would be longer 
than that.’’ Id. at 85. When asked for his 
‘‘number,’’ Dr. Zivot pointed to a study on 
lethal injections administered to horses; he 
said the study recorded ‘‘a range of as short 
as fifty-two seconds and as long as about two 
hundred and forty seconds before they see 
isoelectric EEG.’’ Id. at 85-86. Dr. Zivot 
noted that the ‘‘number’’ that he derived 
from the horse study was ‘‘more than twice 
as long as’’ the number suggested by Dr. 
Antognini. Id. at 86. He defined ‘‘isoelectric 
EEG’’ as ‘‘indicative of at least electrical 
silence on the parts of the brain that the 
electroencephalogram has access to.’’ Id.  
The district court observed that ‘‘[a]n 
execution is typically conducted with the 
prisoner lying on his back,’’ and that the 
record ‘‘establishes that [Bucklew] has 
difficulty breathing while in that position 
because the tumors can cause choking or an 
inability to breathe.’’ The court understood 
Dr. Zivot to mean that ‘‘it could be fifty- two 
to 240 seconds before the pentobarbital 
induces a state in which [Bucklew] could no 
longer sense that he is choking or unable to 
breathe.’’ Thus, the court concluded that 
‘‘construing the Record in [Bucklew’s] favor 
reveals that it could be fifty-two to 240 
seconds before the pentobarbital induces a 
state in which [Bucklew] could no longer 
sense that he is choking or unable to 
breathe.’’ Again, the court reasoned that ‘‘the 
facts construed in [Bucklew’s] favor would 
permit a factfinder to conclude that for as 
long as four minutes [Bucklew] could be 
aware that he is choking or unable to breathe 
but be unable to ‘adjust’ his breathing to 
remedy the situation.’’ On that basis, the 
court presumed for purposes of the motion 
for summary judgment that ‘‘there is a 
substantial risk that [Bucklew] will 
experience choking and an inability to 
breathe for up to four minutes.’’  
 The State disputes that there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact on the first 
element of Bucklew’s claim, but the district 
court properly concluded that findings of fact 
were required. Bucklew pointed to evidence 
from Missouri corrections officials that 
prisoners have always laid flat on their backs 
during executions by lethal injection in 
Missouri. R. Doc. 182-7, at 10; R. Doc. 182-
9, at 1; R. Doc. 182-12, at 29, 91. One official 
testified that he did not know whether the 
gurney could be adjusted. R. Doc. 182-12, at 
91. Another official believed that the head of 
the gurney ‘‘could’’ be raised (or that a 
gurney with that capability could be 
acquired), and that an anesthesiologist would 
have ‘‘the freedom’’ to adjust the gurney 
‘‘if’’ he or she determined that it would be in 
the best medical interest of the offender to do 
so. R. Doc. 182-7, at 14. But the State did not 
present evidence about how it would position 
Bucklew or the gurney during his execution. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the 
district court was required to construe the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 
Bucklew. Under that standard, without 
undisputed evidence from the State that it 
would alter its ordinary procedures, the court 
did not err by concluding that a finder of fact 
could infer that the State would proceed as in 
all other executions, with Bucklew lying on 
his back. 
The State argues that the district court 
erred in discerning a genuine dispute of 
material fact on the first element because Dr. 
Zivot did not specify the length of the 
expected ‘‘twilight stage’’ during which 
Bucklew would be unable to adjust his 
positioning yet still sense pain. The State also 
complains that Dr. Zivot did not specify that 
Bucklew’s pain awareness would continue 
for fifty-two seconds or longer until brain 
waves ceased. There certainly are grounds to 
attack the reliability and credibility of Dr. 
Zivot’s opinion, including the imprecision of 
some of his testimony, his opposition to all 
forms of lethal injection, his possible 
misreading of the horse study on which he 
partially relied, and his inaccurate predictions 
of calamities at prior executions. But he did 
opine that Bucklew was likely to 
‘‘experience prolonged feelings of 
suffocation and excruciating pain’’ if 
executed by lethal injection, R. Doc. 182-1, 
at 147, and that there ‘‘will be points’’ before 
Bucklew dies when his ability to regulate his 
airway will be impaired so that he ‘‘will 
experience it as choking.’’ Id. at 81. The 
district court did not err in concluding that it 
could not resolve the dispute between the 
experts on summary judgment.  
On the second element of Bucklew’s 
claim, the district court concluded as a matter 
of law that Bucklew failed to show that his 
proposed alternative method of execution—
administration of nitrogen gas—would 
significantly reduce the substantial risk of 
severe pain that the court recognized under 
the first element. The majority affirms the 
district court’s judgment on this basis. Taking 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Bucklew, however, a factfinder could 
conclude that nitrogen gas would render 
Bucklew insensate more quickly than 
pentobarbital and would thus eliminate the 
risk that he would experience prolonged 
feelings of choking or suffocation. Dr. 
Antognini testified that a person who is 
administered nitrogen gas ‘‘would be 
unconscious very quickly,’’ and that the 
 onset of action from lethal gas ‘‘is going to 
be relatively fast, just like Pentobarbital’s 
onset.’’ R. Doc. 182-5, at 58-59 (emphasis 
added). Given Dr. Antognini’s testimony that 
pentobarbital would render Bucklew 
insensate within twenty to thirty seconds, the 
record in the light most favorable to Bucklew 
supports a finding based on Antognini’s 
testimony that nitrogen gas would relieve 
Bucklew from any pain of choking or 
suffocating within twenty to thirty seconds. A 
trier of fact may accept all, some, or none of 
a witness’s testimony, United States v. 
Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1992), and 
a plaintiff may rely on testimony from the 
defendant’s expert to meet his burden if the 
testimony is advantageous to the plaintiff. 
See IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy 
Co., Inc., 818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016). 
If the factfinder accepted Dr. Zivot’s 
testimony as to the effect of pentobarbital, 
and Dr. Antognini’s uncontroverted 
testimony as to effect of nitrogen gas, then 
Bucklew’s proposed alternative method 
would significantly reduce the substantial 
risk of severe pain that the district court 
identified in its analysis of the first element.  
For these reasons, there are genuine 
disputes of material fact that preclude 
summary judgment and require findings of 
fact by the district court. I would therefore 
remand the case for further proceedings. The 
district court may then promptly make 
appropriate factual findings about, among 
other things, how Bucklew will be positioned 
during an execution, whether his airway will 
be blocked during an execution, and how 
pentobarbital (and, if necessary, nitrogen gas) 
will affect his consciousness and ability to 
sense potential pain.  
*    *    * 
The State contends that we should not 
reach the merits of Bucklew’s claim because 
several procedural obstacles require 
dismissal of his complaint. The majority does 
not rely on these points, and I find them 
unavailing.  
First, the State contends that Bucklew 
did not raise his present claim in his fourth 
amended complaint. Bucklew’s complaint, 
however, does allege the essence of his 
current theory. The complaint asserts that the 
tumors in Bucklew’s throat require ‘‘him to 
sleep with his upper body elevated’’ because 
if he lies flat, ‘‘the tumor then fully obstructs 
his airway.’’ Id. at 18-19. It continued: 
‘‘Executions are conducted on a gurney, and 
the risks arising from Mr. Bucklew’s airway 
are even greater if he is lying flat. Because of 
the hemangiomas, Mr. Bucklew is unable to 
sleep in a normal recumbent position because 
the tumors cause greater obstruction in that 
position.’’ R. Doc. 53, at 35. Bucklew further 
alleged that execution by lethal injection 
‘‘poses an enormous risk that Mr. Bucklew 
will suffer extreme, excruciating and 
prolonged pain—all accompanied by 
choking and struggling for air.’’ Id. at 36. The 
complaint was adequate under a notice 
pleading regime to raise a claim that the 
execution procedure would result in an 
obstructed airway and choking or 
suffocation.  
If necessary, moreover, the district 
court acted within its discretion by treating 
the complaint as impliedly amended to 
include Bucklew’s present claim. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(b)(2). Bucklew clearly notified the 
 State of his contention in his opposition to the 
State’s motion for summary judgment. R. 
Doc. 192-1, at 1-3, 11-17. Yet rather than 
communicate surprise and object that the 
claim was not pleaded, the State addressed 
Bucklew’s contention on the merits. R. Doc. 
200, at 4-5. Where a party has actual notice 
of an unpleaded issue and has been given an 
adequate opportunity to cure any surprise 
resulting from a change in the pleadings, 
there is implied consent to an amendment. 
Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co., 
768 F.3d 779, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2014).  
Second, the State argues that the five- 
year statute of limitations bars Bucklew’s 
claim, because he was aware of his claim in 
2008 and did not file his complaint until May 
9, 2014. A claim under § 1983 accrues when 
a plaintiff has ‘‘a complete and present cause 
of action’’ and ‘‘can file suit and obtain 
relief.’’ Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 
127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) 
(quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning 
Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 
522 U.S. 192, 201, 118 S.Ct. 542, 139 
L.Ed.2d 553 (1997) ). Bucklew asserts that he 
did not have knowledge of his present claim, 
and therefore could not have filed suit and 
obtained relief, until his medical condition 
progressed and he was examined by Dr. Zivot 
in April 2014. As evidence that Bucklew 
could have brought his claim earlier, the State 
relies on a 2008 petition that Bucklew 
submitted to the Missouri Supreme Court. 
The petition sought funding for an expert 
witness to investigate the interaction of the 
State’s existing execution protocol with 
Bucklew’s health condition. The possible 
claim addressed in the 2008 funding petition, 
however, focused on the potential for uncon- 
trolled bleeding and ineffective circulation of 
drugs within Bucklew’s body under the 
State’s former three-drug execution protocol. 
The petition does not demonstrate that 
Bucklew was then on notice of a claim that a 
future execution protocol using the single 
drug pentobarbital would create a substantial 
risk of severe pain resulting from tumors 
blocking his airway while laying supine 
during an execution.  
Third, the State urges that Bucklew’s 
claim is barred by res judicata or claim 
preclusion, because Bucklew could have 
litigated his as-applied challenge to the 
execution protocol in an earlier case styled 
Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-C-BP. 
In Zink, a group of inmates sentenced to 
death, including Bucklew, brought a facial 
challenge to Missouri’s execution protocol. 
A complaint was filed in August 2012, and 
the eventual deadline for motions to amend 
pleadings was January 27, 2014. Principles of 
claim preclusion do not bar Bucklew’s as-
applied challenge if he was unaware of the 
basis for the claim in time to include it in the 
Zink litigation. See Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2292, 
2305, 195 L.Ed.2d 665 (2016). The State 
again points to Bucklew’s 2008 funding 
petition in support of its preclusion defense, 
but for reasons discussed, that petition does 
not establish that Bucklew’s present claim 
was available to him in 2008. At oral 
argument, the State argued that Bucklew 
could have added his as- applied challenge to 
the Zink litigation after he was examined by 
Dr. Zivot in April 2014, because the district 
court granted the Zink plaintiffs leave to 
amend their complaint in May 2014. But the 
court’s order allowed the Zink plaintiffs leave 
 to amend only a single count of the complaint 
to allege a feasible alternative method of 
execution. The order did not reopen the 
pleadings deadline for as-applied claims by 
the several individual plaintiffs. See Zink v. 
Lombardi, No. 12-04209- CV-C-BP, 2014 
WL 11309998, at *4-5, 12 (W.D. Mo. May 2, 
2014). The State therefore has not established 
that Bucklew’s as- applied claim is barred by 
res judicata.  
*    *    * 
For these reasons, I would reverse the 
judgment of the district court and remand for 
further proceedings to be conducted with 
dispatch.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 “Supreme Court to Hear Cases on Death Penalty and Class Actions” 
 
 
The New York Times 
 
Adam Liptak 
 
April 30, 2018 
 
[Parts of the Article are Omitted.] 
The court agreed to hear an appeal from a 
death row inmate in Missouri with a rare 
medical condition that he says will cause 
excruciating pain if he is put to death by 
lethal injection. Lawyers for the inmate, 
Russell Bucklew, said his condition, 
cavernous hemangioma, would make him 
choke on his own blood during his execution. 
In 2015, in Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme 
Court ruled against inmates challenging 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, saying 
they had failed to identify an available and 
preferable method of execution. 
In the new case, Bucklew v. Precythe, No. 
17-8151, Mr. Bucklew did propose an 
alternative, saying lethal gas was preferable 
to the state’s current method of an injection 
of a lethal dose of pentobarbital. But the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, in St. Louis, ruled in March that Mr. 
Bucklew had not shown that his alternative 
would be less painful. 
Mr. Bucklew was convicted of murdering a 
man who had been seeing his former 
girlfriend and of kidnapping and raping her. 
The Supreme Court stayed his execution in 
March by a 5-to-4 vote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Death-Row Inmate With Rare Disease Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review
 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Greg Stohr 
 
April 30, 2018 
 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal 
from a Missouri death-row inmate who says 
his rare medical condition means the state’s 
lethal-injection method probably would 
cause him to choke on his own blood. 
 
Convicted murderer Russell Bucklew, 49, 
says Missouri’s execution protocol method 
would be unconstitutional in his case because 
he suffers from cavernous hemangioma, a 
disease that has caused blood-filled tumors in 
his head, neck and throat. 
 
The Supreme Court broadly upheld lethal 
injection a decade ago but left open the 
possibility that individual inmates could 
press challenges based on their own 
particular circumstances. 
 
The court voted 5-4 to halt Bucklew’s 
execution on March 20 while the justices 
considered whether to take up his appeal. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing vote on 
death-penalty cases, voted with the court’s 
liberal wing in the majority. 
 
Bucklew, who has proposed the state look to 
lethal gas an alternative way of killing him, 
says a federal appeals court made a series of 
errors in letting his execution go forward. 
Bucklew says the appeals court improperly 
assumed that the state’s medical team would 
be able to manage his condition during the 
execution. 
 
Bucklew was convicted of bursting in the 
home where his ex-girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, 
was staying in 1996. Bucklew shot and killed 
the homeowner, Michael Sanders, before 
abducting Ray and raping her. He isn’t 
challenging his conviction or death sentence. 
 
Missouri Attorney General Josh Hawley 
urged the Supreme Court not to hear the 
appeal, saying Bucklew waited too long to 
raise the issue and hasn’t provided enough 
evidence of a risk of severe pain. 
 
The case, which the court will hear during the 
nine-month term that starts in October, is 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 17-8151. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“Missouri appeal could delay Mississippi death penalty case” 
 
 
Midland Reporter-Telegram 
 
Jeff Amy 
 
July 17, 2018 
 
A Missouri appeal over whether lethal 
injection would violate the Constitution's ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment could delay 
a Mississippi case over similar issues. 
 
Lawyers for some death row inmates in 
Mississippi are asking a federal judge to 
postpone an August trial on Mississippi's 
death penalty procedures. They say state 
Attorney General Jim Hood doesn't oppose 
the delay. 
 
If U.S. District Judge Henry T. Wingate 
agrees, no executions in Mississippi are 
likely until after the Missouri case is decided. 
Arguments in the Missouri case are set for 
this fall, and a ruling might not come until 
2019. Mississippi hasn't executed anyone 
since 2012, in part because of legal 
challenges to the state's lethal injection 
methods, as well as the state's difficulty in 
obtaining drugs. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court in April agreed to 
review the Missouri case, brought by an 
inmate named Russell Bucklew. The inmate 
says his rare medical condition could cause 
him to choke on his own blood during an 
execution. The court blocked Bucklew's 
execution in March after he argued that a 
tumor in his throat is likely to rupture and 
bleed during the administration of the drugs 
that would be used to kill him. 
 
Both the Missouri and the Mississippi cases 
hinge on what an inmate must do to show an 
alternate execution method is available that 
would reduce risk of needless suffering. 
That's required to meet a previous Supreme 
Court ruling that says inmates challenging a 
method of execution must show that there's 
an alternative that is likely to be less painful. 
In the Mississippi case, inmates are arguing 
they should be put to death using a single 
large dose of a barbiturate called 
pentobarbital. 
 
Mississippi prison officials have said they're 
not going to use pentobarbital anymore 
because they can't obtain the drug after 
manufacturers opposed to its use in 
executions cut off supplies. But lawyers for 
the Mississippi inmates argue that doesn't 
make any sense because Texas, Missouri and 
Georgia continue to execute inmates using 
pentobarbital that they're obtaining from 
somewhere. 
 
Lawyer Jim Craig, who represents some of 
the inmates, said it would be a waste of time 
 to have a trial when the Supreme Court is 
likely to clarify the law at issue. 
 
Death row inmates in the Mississippi case 
include Richard Jordan, sentenced for 
kidnapping and killing a Harrison County 
woman in 1976; Ricky Chase, sentenced for 
the 1989 killing of a 70-year-old vegetable 
salesman in Copiah County; Thomas Loden, 
sentenced for the 2000 kidnapping, rape and 
murder of an Itawamba County waitress; 
Roger Thorson, sentenced for killing a 
former girlfriend in Harrison County in 1987; 
and Robert Simon, sentenced for the 1990 
killings of three members of a Quitman 
County family. 
 
The Missouri case is Bucklew v. Precythe , 
17-8151. 
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Gamble v. United States  
 
Ruling Below: United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed.Appx 750 (11th Cir. 2017) 
 
Overview: Terance Martez Gamble was pulled over in 2015 for a broken tail light on his car when 
a gun and drug paraphernalia was discovered in the car. Seven years prior, Gamble was convicted 
of second-degree robbery and was barred from owning a firearm. Gamble was charged for illegal 
possession of a firearm by the State of Alabama and the Federal Government, for the exact same 
incident in 2015. Gamble claims that his federal indictment should be dismissed on the ground that 
it violated his Fifth Amendment protection from Double Jeopardy.  
 
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the 
double jeopardy clause. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA., Plaintiff- Appellee, 
v. 
TERANCE MARTEZ GAMBLE, Defendant-Appellant 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
 
Decided on July 28, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
Before HULL, WILSON, and ANDERSON, 
Circuit Judges.  
 
PER CURIAM:  
 
Terance Martez Gamble appeals his 
conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1). Gamble argues that the district 
court erred by determining that double 
jeopardy did not prohibit the federal 
government from prosecuting Gamble for the 
same conduct for which he had been 
prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of 
Alabama.  
 
We review de novo, as a pure 
question of law, any possible violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. 
McIntosh, 580 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
  
The Supreme Court has determined 
that prosecution in federal and state court for 
the same conduct does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal 
governments are separate sovereigns. Abbate 
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195, 79 S. Ct. 
666 (1959). We have followed the precedent 
set by Abbate in Hayes, stating that unless 
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and until the Supreme Court overturns 
Abbate, the double jeopardy claim must fail 
based on the dual sovereignty doctrine. 
United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 817-18 
(5th Cir. 1979). We have, more recently, 
stated that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not prevent different sovereigns (i.e., a 
state government and the federal 
government) from punishing a defendant for 
the same criminal conduct.” United States v. 
Bidwell, 393 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 
2004).  
 
In Sanchez-Valle, the Supreme Court 
stated that the states were separate sovereigns 
from the federal government because the 
States rely on authority originally belonging 
to them before admission to the Union and 
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment. 
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle, 579 U.S. __, 
__, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1871 (2016). It explained 
that prior to forming the Union, the States 
possessed separate and independent sources 
of power and authority, which they continue 
to draw upon in enacting and enforcing 
criminal laws. Id. State prosecutions 
therefore have their most ancient roots in an 
“inherent sovereignty” unconnected to, and 
indeed pre-existing, the U.S. Congress. Id. 
The Supreme Court differentiated Puerto 
Rico from the States, stating that it was not a 
sovereign distinct from the United States 
because it had derived its authority from the 
U.S. Congress. Id. at 1873-74. It concluded 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars both 
Puerto Rico and the United States from 
prosecuting a single person for the same 
conduct under equivalent criminal laws. Id. at 
1876. 
 
The district court did not err by 
determining that double jeopardy did not 
prohibit the federal government from 
prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for 
which he had been prosecuted and sentenced 
for by the State of Alabama, because based 
on Supreme Court precedent, dual 
sovereignty allows a state government and 
the federal government to prosecute an 
individual for the same crime, when the 
States rely on authority originally belonging 
to them before admission to the Union and 
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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“Supreme Court agrees to take up double jeopardy issue” 
 
 
NBC News 
 
Pete Williams 
 
June 28, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Thursday to 
reconsider its long-standing view that putting 
someone on trial more than once for the same 
crime does not violate the Constitution's 
protection against double jeopardy. 
Among the provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment is that no person shall be 
"subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb." That's popularly 
understood to mean that nobody can be put 
on trial twice for the same crime. 
But in a line of cases stretching back more 
than 150 years, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that being prosecuted twice — once by a state 
and again in federal court — doesn't violate 
the clause because the states and the federal 
government are "separate sovereigns." 
The court has held that when a defendant in a 
single act breaks both a federal and a state 
law, that amounts to two distinct offenses and 
can result in two separate prosecutions. 
Barring states from prosecuting someone 
already tried in federal court "would be a 
shocking and untoward deprivation of the 
historic right and obligation of the states to 
maintain peace and order within their 
confines," the court has said. 
Lawyers for an Alabama man, Terance 
Gamble, urged the justices to consider 
overturning those earlier decisions. 
Convicted of robbery in 2008, Gamble was 
pulled over seven years later for a traffic 
violation. Police found a handgun in his car, 
so he was charged with violating Alabama's 
law barring felons from possessing firearms. 
The local U.S. attorney charged him with 
violating a similar federal law. Because of the 
added federal conviction, his prison sentence 
was extended by three years. 
Gamble's lawyers said the foundations for 
those earlier rulings began to crumble in 1969 
when the Supreme Court ruled that the 
double jeopardy provision, originally meant 
to be a check on federal power, also applied 
to the states. It is inconsistent, they said, to let 
parallel actions of state and federal officials 
produce a result that would be impermissible 
if done by either jurisdiction alone. 
And his lawyers said Congress has 
dramatically expanded the number and scope 
of federal laws in recent years, creating more 
duplications with state laws, a problem the 
earlier Supreme Court decisions never 
envisioned. 
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The court will hear Gamble's appeal in the 
fall. He is set to be released from federal 
prison in 2020. 
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“Upcoming SCOTUS Case Could Complicate NY Effort to Close Double 
Jeopardy ‘Loophole’” 
 
 
New York Law Journal 
 
Colby Hamilton and Dan M. Clark  
 
July 2, 2018   
On June 28, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
to hear a case challenging the legal principle 
that the federal government and those of the 
states represent “separate sovereigns,” a 
long-held doctrine that has provided a work-
around for state and federal prosecutors faced 
with constitutional double jeopardy concerns. 
 
In the case, captioned Gamble v. United 
States, Terance Martez Gamble challenged 
prosecutions over charges of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm. Those cases—which 
resulted in convictions—were brought by 
Alabama state prosecutors and U.S. 
attorneys. 
Gamble argued the dual convictions violated 
constitutional protection against facing 
double jeopardy for the same offense. He is 
currently serving nearly three additional 
years in federal prison beyond his Alabama 
state court sentence. 
The decision by the nation’s highest cout 
comes at a critical moment for supporters of 
changes to  New York’s double 
jeopardy protections that go beyond the Fifth 
Amendment. Lawmakers and the state 
Attorney General’s Office are pushing for the 
close of a so-called loophole that could serve 
as a kind of “get out of jail” scenario for those 
in President Donald Trump’s orbit. Under 
certain circumstances, individuals close to 
the president, facing federal prosecution, 
could see a pardon absolve them of not only 
federal charges, but bar state prosecutors 
from bringing a similar case under New York 
law. 
New York, like many states, currently does 
not allow someone to be prosecuted on state 
charges after a federal pardon. New York’s 
loophole, according to the office of Attorney 
General Barbara Underwood, allows for a 
unique trick of the law: absent a specific 
exemption, if a defendant pleads guilty, or if 
a federal jury is sworn in at trial, state law 
bars charging that defendant over the exact 
same criminal acts. 
One such exemption is if a court nullifies a 
prior criminal proceeding, such as when an 
appellate court vacates a conviction. 
However, state law does not speak to what 
happens if the president were to issue a 
strategically timed pardon under 
circumstances that triggered double jeopardy 
protections. 
The issue was raised most recently when 
Trump pardoned conservative political 
activist Dinesh D’Souza in May. D’Souza 
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pleaded guilty to campaign finance fraud 
before U.S. District Judge Richard Berman of 
the Southern District of New York, and was 
sentenced in September 2014 to five years of 
probation. 
“We can’t afford to wait to see who will be 
next,” Underwood said in a statement at the 
time. “Lawmakers must act now to close 
New York’s double jeopardy loophole and 
ensure that anyone who evades federal justice 
by virtue of a politically expedient pardon 
can be held accountable if they violate New 
York law.” 
Things appeared to be moving forward 
earlier this year when Democrats in the state 
Legislature introduced a bill in April to 
reverse that rule in New York. Assemblyman 
Joe Lentol, D-Brooklyn, and Sen. Todd 
Kaminsky, D-Long Beach, sponsored the bill 
in their respective chambers. 
The legislation was sent to committee in each 
chamber, where it stayed through the end of 
this year’s legislative session. There were 
two reasons the bill did not make it to the 
floor for a vote in either chamber. The most 
obvious was Republican opposition in the 
Senate. Sen. Patrick Gallivan, R-Elma, chairs 
the Crime Victims, Crime and Correction 
Committee in the Senate. He called the bill 
“disgraceful” and compared it to Gov. 
Andrew Cuomo’s executive order pardoning 
thousands of parolees this year so they could 
vote. 
“I think it’s disgraceful. It’s OK that the 
governor pardons 35,000 people and has 
parole officers handing out and directing 
parolees, murderers, rapists, where they go to 
vote?” Gallivan said. “But God forbid a 
president, just like President Obama, just like 
President Clinton, pardons somebody, now 
we’re going to question the president just 
because of what his party is?” 
The bill’s sponsors will tell you that it’s not 
about party, it’s about Trump. But as written 
it would apply to his successors. 
“This bill would not just apply to the current 
president, it will apply to any president going 
forward,” Kaminsky said. “I think the 
president’s actions have laid bare a loophole 
that needs to be closed.” 
That idea also turned out to be the other big 
obstacle to the bill, Lentol said. Criminal 
justice advocates were worried the legislation 
would be used by prosecutors in New York 
to bring charges indiscriminately against 
people other than Trump and his allies. 
“The major flaw with the bill is that it would 
allow a lot of district attorneys power, and 
sometimes maybe inappropriately charge 
someone with a crime,” Lentol said. “The bill 
has wide scope and I think we need to narrow 
it in order for it to not be used by folks who 
may be unscrupulous.” 
Kaminsky’s answer to that concern was a 
section of the bill that exempts certain 
offenders from also being charged by the 
state. According to the bill, a state prosecutor 
would not be able to bring charges against 
someone if a “reprieve, pardon, or other form 
of clemency was granted five years or more 
after entry of judgment for such offense.” 
“I think the exception that the bill already 
contains is pretty broad,” Kaminsky said. 
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Whatever concerns lawmakers in Albany 
may have over the state’s move to deal with 
double jeopardy issues may now have to 
contend with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision to hear the Gamble case. New York 
University School of Law professor Richard 
Pildes called the move a highly significant 
challenge to decades of doctrinal precedent. 
“I thought it was quite dramatic that they 
announced their decision to reconsider this 
issue,” Pildes said. “At least four of them are 
certainly very interested in whether the court 
should engage in a major reconsideration of 
the doctrine. I think you can read that much 
into the grant.” 
As the petition itself notes, interest in the 
issue among the justices appears to be 
growing. Quoting the court’s 2016 ruling 
in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, Gamble 
noted that both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
and Clarence Thomas have called for a fresh 
examination of the doctrine. 
Pildes noted that it’s tough to bring a 
challenge to the separate sovereigns 
exception. 
“It’s very hard to have these cases teed up to 
squarely present the issue,” he said. 
Even Gamble noted in his petition that the 
few cases that have been brought to challenge 
the doctrine “have been riddled with vehicle 
problems.” These challenges will ultimately 
mean worries about the potential impact 
of Gamble on any move by New York to 
close its double jeopardy loophole are likely 
to be unfounded, according to Columbia Law 
School professor and former Manhattan 
federal prosecutor Daniel Richman. 
Even if Gamble were to do away with the 
separate sovereigns exception, Richman said, 
“The question becomes, do the elements of 
one prosecution overlap with the elements of 
the other prosecution?” 
In reality, this is so rarely the case that, for 
Richman, the concern becomes largely an 
academic one and “a bit of a red herring.” 
More often than not, when federal and state 
charges are lined up, “there’s no overlap, or 
almost no overlap, that would ring Fifth 
Amendment chimes in the absence of the 
dual sovereign analysis,” he said. 
“This is just a reminder of the thinness of 
federal double jeopardy protections, even 
putting the dual sovereign protections aside,” 
he added. 
The potential impact of Gamble is, for now at 
least, not deterring those in support of closing 
the state’s double jeopardy loophole from 
moving forward. 
Lentol said he’s exploring other options to 
garner support for the bill. One would allow 
only the state attorney general to bring state 
charges against someone who’s received a 
federal pardon. That would help curb the 
possibility of having a district attorney target 
someone acquitted of a federal crime, Lentol 
said. 
Another option would be to have the bill 
sunset at the end of Trump’s presidency, 
Lentol said. 
Both options could build an appetite for the 
legislation to pass during next year’s 
legislative session. Kaminsky believes if the 
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Senate passes the bill, the Assembly will 
follow suit. That seems unlikely for now 
while Republicans hold the majority in the 
upper chamber. Democrats need to gain at 
least one seat in this year’s election for that to 
change. 
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“Don’t Gamble on Double Jeopardy” 
 
 
Cato Institute 
 
Ilya Shapiro 
 
December 4, 2017 
 
Terance Gamble was convicted of second-
degree robbery in Alabama in 2008. That’s a 
felony, so he was barred from possessing a 
firearm under both federal and state law. 
Seven years later, Gamble was pulled over 
for a broken taillight. Smelling marijuana, the 
police officer searched the car and found, 
among other things, a 9mm handgun. 
Alabama prosecuted Gamble under its 
“felon-in-possession” statute and he was 
ultimately sentenced to a year in prison. 
Concurrent with the state’s prosecution, 
however, the U.S. attorney charged Gamble 
with the same offense under federallaw. He 
was sentenced to 46 months in prison and will 
be released early in 2020, nearly three years 
after he would have been released from state 
prison. 
 
At both the trial and appellate level, Gamble 
argued that the federal prosecution violated 
his Fifth Amendment right against being 
placed twice in jeopardy for the same crime. 
But given the “dual sovereignty” exception to 
that Double Jeopardy Clause, which the 
Supreme Court created 60 years ago—the 
idea that federal and state prosecutions have 
to be counted separately—the courts had to 
ignore that objection. Cato has joined the 
Constitutional Accountability Center in filing 
a brief urging the Court to review Gamble’s 
case and overturn this misguided exception—
as we’ve done before in Walker v. 
Texas and Tyler v. United States, which 
presented the same issue. 
 
We make three principal arguments. First, 
none of the Framers would have 
contemplated such a large exception to 
Double Jeopardy protection. Even before the 
Founding, English jurist and legal theorist 
William Blackstone wrote that it was 
considered a “universal maxim of the 
common law of England, that no man is to be 
brought into jeopardy of his life, more than 
once, for the same offence.” And in 
congressional debates before the enactment 
of the Fifth Amendment, Rep. Roger 
Sherman observed that “the courts of justice 
would never think of trying and punishing 
twice for the same offence.” Second, the 
practical magnitude of the dual-sovereignty 
exception is much greater today than it was 
60 years ago. For most of our nation’s 
history, the federal government left most 
criminal matters to be handled by the states; 
there were relatively few offenses punishable 
by both authorities. But in recent decades, 
there has been “a stunning expansion of 
federal criminal jurisdiction into a field 
traditionally policed by state and local laws,” 
as Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in dissent 
in Evans v. United States (1992). Now that 
nearly every state crime has a federal analog, 
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the dual-sovereignty exception risks entirely 
swallowing the Double Jeopardy rule. 
Finally, the Supreme Court created the dual-
sovereignty exception a decade before it held 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause fully applies 
to the states. Now that we know that it does, 
there’s no reason why a state prosecution 
shouldn’t “count” when a defendant objects 
to having been prosecuted twice. 
As Justice Hugo Black once put it, also in 
dissent, “If double punishment is what is 
feared, it hurts no less for two ‘Sovereigns’ to 
inflict it than for one.” Bartkus v. 
Illinois (1959). The Court should take this 
common-sense advice and put an end to the 
misguided dual-sovereignty exception, at 
least as it works in practice in modern times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 224 
“Supreme Court to Hear Double Jeopardy Case with Implications for Mueller” 
 
 
Side Bars Blog 
 
Randall Eliason 
 
July 11, 2018 
 
Blockbuster decisions about the president’s 
travel ban and public sector 
unionsdominated the news during the final 
week of the Supreme Court’s term. Less 
noticed was the Court’s surprising 
announcement that next term it will hear an 
important double jeopardy case, Gamble v. 
United States. The Court’s decision 
in Gamble could have implications for the 
Mueller investigation and the president’s 
ability to undermine it by pardoning 
witnesses against him. How the Court — 
which by then may include a new Justice 
Kavanaugh — resolves the case also could 
provide new clues about its willingness to 
overturn firmly-established constitutional 
precedents. 
 
The petitioner, Terance Gamble, was 
convicted of robbery in Alabama in 2008. 
That felony conviction made it illegal for him 
to possess a firearm under both Alabama and 
federal law. In November 2015 police in 
Mobile pulled Gamble over for a broken 
taillight and smelled marijuana. When they 
searched his car they found marijuana, a 
scale, and a 9 mm handgun. 
 
Alabama prosecuted Gamble for the state 
crime of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm. He was convicted and served a one-
year sentence. While the state case was 
pending, federal prosecutors charged him 
with the federal version of the same offense, 
based on the same incident. Gamble pleaded 
guilty to the federal charge but preserved his 
right to appeal and argue that this second 
conviction violated the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The federal 
case resulted in Gamble being sentenced to 
an additional three years in prison. 
Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty 
The protection against double jeopardy is one 
of the English common law doctrines that the 
framers of our Constitution included in the 
Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment 
provides: “No person shall . . . be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb.” The government is not 
allowed to prosecute you repeatedly for the 
same conduct until it gets the result that it 
wants. Once jeopardy attaches – typically 
when you plead guilty or a jury is sworn in – 
the government generally gets one shot at the 
prosecution. 
 
But the clause is subject to a “dual 
sovereignty exception.” For more than 150 
years the Supreme Court has said it does not 
violate double jeopardy for a state and the 
federal government to prosecute a defendant 
for crimes based on the same act and 
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consisting of the same elements. The 
rationale is that within our federalist system 
the federal and state governments are two 
different sovereigns, each with the right to 
enforce its own laws. State and federal crimes 
based on the same conduct thus have not been 
considered to be the same “offence” for 
purposes of double jeopardy. 
Gamble’s Arguments 
In urging the Court to take his case, Gamble 
argued the dual sovereignty exception is 
inconsistent with the history and purpose of 
the Fifth Amendment and should be 
discarded. He first relied on history and 
original intent, claiming the exception did not 
exist at common law and that a conviction or 
acquittal in another country was commonly 
understood to bar a prosecution in England 
based on the same misconduct. 
 
Gamble also noted that the Supreme Court 
first adopted the dual sovereignty exception 
back when the Fifth Amendment was 
considered not to apply to the states. That’s 
no longer the case – the double jeopardy 
clause is now one of the protections in the 
Bill of Rights that the Court has incorporated 
to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Gamble argued this 
makes the older holdings suspect and ripe for 
reexamination. Now that double jeopardy 
clearly applies to the states as well, he argued, 
it’s improper to allow the state and federal 
government to do together what each could 
not do on its own. 
 
Gamble also claimed the dual sovereignty 
exception undermines the purpose of the 
double jeopardy clause. The clause is 
supposed to promote finality. It protects an 
individual from repeated exposure to the 
stress, humiliation, and expense that 
accompany a prosecution. These injuries 
from a repeated prosecution, Gamble urged, 
are the same whether those prosecutions are 
from the same sovereign or two different 
ones. 
 
Finally, Gamble argued the exception needs 
to be overturned due to the dramatic growth 
of federal criminal law. When the exception 
was first adopted the federal criminal code 
was much less extensive. It would have been 
relatively rare for the same conduct to be 
prosecutable by both federal and state 
authorities. But with the dramatic expansion 
of the federal criminal code in the past few 
decades, in the hands of a creative prosecutor 
most state crimes may now be prosecuted 
federally as well. As a result, the risk of the 
harm resulting from a dual prosecution are far 
greater. These changed circumstances, 
Gamble argued, require a new legal standard. 
The Government’s Response 
In urging the Court not to take the case, the 
government argued there is no reason to 
reconsider a doctrine that has been firmly 
established for more than 150 years. It 
claimed the dual sovereignty exception is 
part of the unique American system, where 
the federal and state governments each 
preserve their own sovereign spheres of 
influence. It argued that English common law 
precedents involving prosecutions in other 
countries have no relevance to our federal 
system, where both federal and state 
governments have territorial jurisdiction over 
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crimes occurring within their respective 
borders. 
 
The application of the double jeopardy clause 
to the states is irrelevant, according to the 
government. Even before application to the 
states, if Gamble were correct the clause still 
would have prevented federal prosecution for 
a crime already prosecuted by a state – but the 
Supreme Court has rejected that argument for 
more than 150 years. Application of double 
jeopardy to the states, the government said, 
simply means a state cannot itself prosecute 
someone twice for the same crime. It has no 
effect on whether the state and federal 
governments may proceed separately to 
prosecute the same misconduct. 
 
The government also argued that abandoning 
the exception could lead to state and federal 
governments interfering with each other’s 
law enforcement efforts. A state prosecutor 
could thwart federal law enforcement 
priorities by bringing a case for the same 
conduct and thereby foreclosing a federal 
prosecution — and vice-versa. This could 
lead to a “race to the courthouse” with federal 
and state prosecutors competing to get their 
charges filed first. Such a system would be 
inconsistent with the respect that state and 
federal governments owe each other under 
our federal system. 
(In his reply brief, Gamble has a nice 
response to this point: “The purpose of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, like the purpose of 
the Free Speech Clause or Free Exercise 
Clause, is not to protect the State and federal 
governments from each other but, rather, to 
secure the rights of the individual by 
circumscribing the powers of both.”) 
 
As for the expansion of federal criminal law, 
the government argued this makes the 
exception more important, not less. That 
expansion means there are more potential 
opportunities for federal law enforcement 
potentially to encroach on the states. 
Federalism demands that the states be 
allowed to preserve their own sphere of 
influence and law enforcement priorities 
when it comes to crimes committed within 
their borders. 
 
The bottom line argument for the government 
was that there is no good reason to disturb 
such a well-settled constitutional doctrine. 
Dual prosecutions are relatively rare, and 
judges always have the ability to take such 
factors into account when fashioning an 
appropriate sentence. 
Why Did the Court Take the Case? 
Gamble presents a fascinating mix of issues 
and implications. It’s not at all clear why the 
Court took the case. There was no split in the 
lower courts or other compelling reason to re-
examine such a settled doctrine. That the 
Court agreed to hear the case anyway is 
probably a sign it’s inclined to rule in 
Gamble’s favor. On the other hand, the Court 
re-scheduled consideration of the case in 
conference a remarkable eleven times before 
finally deciding to grant the petition on the 
final day of the term. That suggests at least 
some members of the Court were really 
wrestling with the decision. 
 
The Court’s action is even more surprising 
considering it just reaffirmed the dual 
sovereignty doctrine two years ago in a case 
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called Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. In an 
opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that 
Puerto Rico and the United States are not 
separate sovereigns for purposes of double 
jeopardy and thus the defendant could not be 
prosecuted by both. But the majority opinion 
did not question the validity of the dual 
sovereignty exception and took it as settled 
law. 
 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Thomas, 
wrote a concurrence in Sanchez 
Valle criticizing the dual sovereignty 
exception and suggesting it should be 
revisited in an appropriate case. Gamble 
relied heavily on that concurrence when 
urging the Court to grant his petition. 
Since Sanchez Valle was decided Justice 
Gorsuch also has joined the Court, and 
perhaps he was a third vote to take the case. 
But it takes four Justices to 
grant certiorari and it’s not clear where the 
fourth vote came from – or whether there will 
be five votes to actually overturn the dual 
sovereignty exception. 
 
Arguments about the understanding of the 
clause in common law England may appeal 
to originalists like Justice Gorsuch. But 
conservative Justices also may be concerned 
about federalism and whether a federal 
prosecution can effectively trump a state’s 
own law enforcement efforts. On the other 
hand, arguments about the purpose of the 
clause and protecting defendants from 
repeated harassment may resonate with 
Justices on the Court’s more liberal wing, as 
suggested by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence 
in Sanchez Valle. The case could lead to 
some very interesting voting alignments. 
Potential Implications of Gamble 
Gamble has potential implications for 
prosecutions that could be brought by special 
counsel Robert Mueller. An issue looming 
over the Mueller investigation has been 
whether president Trump might pardon 
members of his own family or potential 
witnesses against him — or even himself. 
One safeguard against that has been the 
availability of state prosecutions. The 
president cannot grant pardons for state 
crimes. That leaves open the possibility that 
even if Trump pardoned people such as Paul 
Manafort, New York state prosecutors might 
be able to pursue financial crimes that 
violated New York law. Reports that Mueller 
has been cooperating with the New York 
Attorney General’s office have noted that 
state prosecutions could be used as leverage 
to induce cooperation in Mueller’s inquiry 
even if Trump pardoned witnesses for federal 
crimes. 
 
If the dual sovereignty exception is 
discarded, however, this safety net could be 
trimmed. For example, if Paul Manafort were 
convicted of financial crimes by federal 
prosecutors and then Trump pardoned him, 
New York state prosecutors may no longer be 
able to prosecute Manafort for the state 
crimes covering the same misconduct. 
 
This highlights an interesting side effect of 
abandoning the dual sovereignty doctrine: it 
would mean the president could, in some 
cases, effectively grant pardons for state 
crimes by pardoning a federal defendant who 
had already been placed in jeopardy for the 
federal version of those same crimes. This 
would represent a dramatic expansion of the 
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pardon power and of presidential ability to 
interfere with state law enforcement. 
 
Another interesting aspect of Gamble that 
will deserve attention is the role of stare 
decisis. The upcoming confirmation hearings 
for Trump’s Supreme Court nominee Brett 
Kavanaugh will undoubtedly focus on the 
doctrine of stare decisis and how it applies to 
landmark cases such as Roe v. Wade. 
 
The same week that it agreed to 
hear Gamble, the Court overruled a forty-one 
year precedent involving public unions when 
it decided the Janus case. Gamble is asking 
the Supreme Court to overrule constitutional 
holdings that have been on the books for 
decades. Gamble will present the Court with 
another opportunity to discuss stare 
decisis and when it is appropriate to overturn 
settled Supreme Court precedents. That 
discussion will be closely watched, 
particularly if a new Justice Kavanaugh is on 
the Court. 
 
Practically speaking, even if the dual 
sovereignty doctrine is overturned the effect 
may be relatively limited. In many situations 
state and federal crimes do not entirely 
overlap and both state and federal 
prosecutions for the same general conduct 
will still be possible. And my experience is 
that cases involving dual prosecutions are 
pretty rare. Prosecutors are busy; if justice is 
being pursued by their counterparts they are 
usually happy to turn their attention to other 
cases and not duplicate those efforts. 
 
Some states, including New York, already 
provide a broader double jeopardy protection 
by statute. Professor Jed Shugerman has 
noted this could have implications for New 
York state prosecutions of people like Paul 
Manafort and Michael Cohen if they are 
prosecuted by Mueller and then pardoned by 
President Trump. That remains true whether 
or not Gamble overturns the dual sovereignty 
exception – unless New York amends its law, 
as Shugerman has urged. Professor 
Shugerman has also suggested Mueller may 
be strategically refraining from filing certain 
charges, effectively reserving those charges 
for the state prosecutors in the event Trump 
grants a pardon. That sort of tactic could 
become even more important based on the 
Court’s decision in Gamble. 
 
But of course the Mueller investigation is not 
the norm. The unprecedented issues and 
concerns surrounding the Mueller 
investigation do not affect routine law 
enforcement. Most prosecutors, most of the 
time, do not have to worry about the president 
potentially obstructing their investigations by 
granting pardons. Gamble thus looms 
potentially larger in the Mueller investigation 
that it does for law enforcement generally. 
 
Gamble should be argued late this year or 
early in 2019. The Court’s decision to 
hear Gamble seems like a sign that the dual 
sovereignty exception’s days may be 
numbered. But the decision, and how the 
Court reaches it, could end up having 
implications that extend far beyond the facts 
of Gamble’s own case. 
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Garza v. Idaho  
 
Ruling Below: Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017) 
 
Overview: Gilberto Garza Jr. entered into two plea agreements waiving his right to appeal for 
aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance. When sentenced, the Court 
acknowledged Garza’s appeal waiver, but simultaneously informed him of his right to appeal and 
his right to a lawyer if he did decide to appeal. Garza claims that his trial counsel was 
constitutionally inadequate because the lawyer would not file an appeal, even after Garza 
repeatedly requested for one.   
 
Issue: Whether the “presumption of prejudice” recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when 
a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides 
not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver. 
Gilberto GARZA Jr., Petitioner- Appellant 
v. 
State of IDAHO, Respondent 
 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
 
Decided on November 6, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
BURDICK, Circuit Judge:  
 
Gilberto Garza, Jr., appeals the Ada 
County district court’s order dismissing his 
petitions for post-conviction relief. Garza 
signed two plea agreements relating to 
charges of aggravated assault and possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute. As part of his plea agreements 
Garza waived his right to appeal. Despite the 
waivers, Garza instructed his attorney to 
appeal. Garza’s attorney declined to file the 
appeals, citing the waivers of appeal in the 
plea agreements. Garza then filed two 
petitions for post-conviction relief, alleging 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
appeal. The district court dismissed Garza’s 
petitions concluding Garza’s counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to appeal. The Court of 
Appeals agreed and affirmed. We granted 
Garza’s timely petition for review and affirm.  
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
This appeal involves two underlying 
convictions and two corresponding petitions 
for post-conviction relief. On January 23, 
2015, Garza entered an Alford plea to 
aggravated assault (assault case), and on 
February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance with 
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intent to deliver (possession case). The plea 
agreements bound the district court to 
sentence Garza to five years in prison for the 
assault case (two years fixed, three 
indeterminate), and another five years in 
prison for the possession case (one year 
fixed, four indeterminate). The sentences 
were to run consecutively, along with another 
prison sentence previously imposed on 
Garza. The district court accepted the plea 
agreements and imposed sentence in 
accordance with them on the same day Garza 
entered the possession plea. In both binding 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(c) plea 
agreements, Garza waived his right to appeal, 
and waived his right to request relief pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The court 
acknowledged that Garza had waived his 
right to appeal but advised Garza of his 
appeal rights anyway. Garza did not appeal 
the convictions or sentences in the underlying 
cases.  
 
Approximately four months later, 
Garza filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief in each case, asserting among other 
things that his trial attorney was ineffective 
for not filing notices of appeal. Garza stated 
in his affidavit submitted in the possession 
case that he asked his attorney to appeal, and 
in his affidavit submitted in his assault case 
that his attorney failed to appeal despite 
numerous phone calls and letters from Garza. 
Garza’s former attorney stated in an affidavit 
that he did not file an appeal because Garza 
“received the sentence(s) he bargained for in 
his [plea] agreement” and “an appeal was 
problematic because [Garza] waived his right 
to appeal in his Rule 11 agreements.”  
 
The court appointed an attorney for 
Garza and issued a notice of intent to dismiss 
all of Garza’s claims except for his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. After both 
parties responded to the notice, the court 
dismissed all post-conviction claims except 
for the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
regarding the failure to file an appeal. The 
parties then filed crossmotions for summary 
adjudication on Garza’s remaining claim for 
post-conviction relief, where Garza sought a 
reopening of the appeals period in the 
underlying criminal cases on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district 
court dismissed Garza’s petitions, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted 
Garza’s timely petition for review 
 
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
 
 1. Was Garza’s attorney ineffective 
when he did not file an appeal after Garza 
requested it even though Garza had waived 
his right to appeal as part of a Rule 11 plea 
agreement? 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
When addressing a petition for 
review, this Court will give “serious 
consideration to the views of the Court of 
Appeals, but directly reviews the decision of 
the lower court.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 
488, 491, 337 P.3d 647, 650 (2014) (quoting 
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 
387, 389 (2007)). “Proceedings for post-
conviction relief are civil in nature, rather 
than criminal, and therefore the applicant 
must prove the allegations in the request for 
relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
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State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 
P.3d 1, 17 (2013). The district court may 
grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition for post-conviction relief when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c). This Court 
exercises free review over the district court’s 
“determination as to whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of 
the facts found.” Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361, 
313 P.3d at 17 (quoting State v. Pearce, 146 
Idaho 241, 248, 192 P.3d 1065, 1072 (2008)). 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
A criminal defendant is permitted to 
waive his right to appeal as part of a plea 
agreement. State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 
457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994). The waiver is 
valid and will be upheld as long as it was 
entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently as part of a plea agreement. Id. 
In this case, the district court found that 
Garza did not show that his plea was not 
knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, nor did 
Garza raise this issue on appeal. The sole 
issue remaining is whether, despite the appeal 
waiver, Garza still had the right to appeal and 
therefore his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file an appeal at his request. 
 
This Court has not yet decided 
whether counsel is ineffective if counsel 
denies his client’s request to file an appeal 
when the client waived the right to appeal in 
a binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea 
agreement. Garza argues that the district 
court erred in requiring him to show, rather 
than presuming, his counsel was deficient 
and that Garza was prejudiced when his 
attorney declined to file an appeal in light of 
the waiver. For the reasons discussed below, 
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
Garza’s petitions for post-conviction relief.  
 
Criminal defendants have a Sixth 
Amendment right to “reasonably effective” 
legal assistance. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. 470, 476 (2000) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); see 
also Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 
P.3d 255, 260 (2011). A defendant claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel must show 
that (1) counsel’s representation was 
deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–92; Self v. State, 
145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. 
App. 2007). To show counsel was deficient, 
the defendant has the burden of showing that 
his attorney’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon 
v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1176 (1988). Generally, when trial counsel 
fails to file an appeal at a criminal 
defendant’s request, such performance is 
professionally unreasonable and therefore 
deficient. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477; 
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 362, 883 
P.2d 714, 720 (Ct. App. 1994). To show that 
counsel’s deficient performance was 
prejudicial, the defendant must show there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s deficiencies, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669; Aragon, 114 
Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. This test 
applies to claims that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a notice of appeal. Flores-
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Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. However, whether 
counsel was ineffective becomes unclear 
when the reason the attorney did not file the 
appeal is because the client waived the right 
to appeal as part of a plea agreement.  
 
Neither the United States Supreme 
Court nor this Court have decided whether an 
attorney has provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel if the attorney declines to file an 
appeal after a defendant has requested it, 
when the defendant has waived the right to 
appeal as part of a plea agreement. There is a 
federal circuit split regarding the issue, which 
involves differing interpretations of the 
United State Supreme Court’s decision in 
Flores-Ortega. The Flores-Ortega case did 
not involve an appeal waiver, but rather dealt 
with whether an attorney provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel when she failed to 
appeal because it was unclear if her client 
wanted to appeal. See Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 475. The Court held “when counsel’s 
constitutionally deficient performance 
deprives a defendant of an appeal that he 
otherwise would have taken, the defendant 
has made out a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to 
an appeal.” Id. at 484.  
 
A majority of federal circuit courts 
have interpreted Flores-Ortega to apply even 
in situations where the defendant has validly 
waived his right to appeal. Those circuits 
hold that attorneys are ineffective when they 
do not file an appeal after the clients 
requested it, regardless of whether the 
defendants had waived their rights. See 
Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 360 
(6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Poindexter, 
492 F.3d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 
2007); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 
960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); Campusano v. 
United States, 442 F.3d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 
F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th 
Cir. 2005); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 
F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir. 2005). Under the 
majority approach, an attorney is required to 
file an appeal at his client’s request, even if 
the attorney thinks the appeal would be 
frivolous. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 771–72. 
When counsel fails to follow his client’s 
express direction to appeal, prejudice is 
presumed. Id. at 772. “The prejudice in 
failure to file a notice of appeal cases is that 
the defendant lost his chance to file the 
appeal, not that he lost a favorable result that 
he would have obtained by appeal.” 
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197. 
 
 Two federal circuit courts and a 
federal district court in an undecided circuit 
follow the minority approach and hold that 
Flores-Ortega does not require an attorney 
be presumed ineffective for failing to appeal 
upon request when there has been a waiver of 
the right to appeal. See Nunez v. United 
States, 546 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2008), 
vacated on other grounds by Nunez v. United 
States, 554 U.S. 911 (2008); United States v. 
Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Maes v. United States, No. 15-CV-240-SM, 
2015 WL 9216583, at *3 (D.N.H. Dec. 16, 
2015). The minority approach does not 
presume deficiency or prejudice when an 
attorney denies his client’s instruction to file 
an appeal when there has been an appeal 
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waiver, and instead requires the defendant 
meet the test in Strickland, which requires 
showing deficient performance and 
prejudice. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 456. The 
minority approach holds that when a 
defendant waives his appellate rights, he no 
longer has a right to appeal, and therefore an 
attorney is not bound to file an appeal at his 
client’s request. Id. at 455.  
 
Though few other states have 
addressed the issue, the ones who have 
continue to apply the Strickland test. See 
Buettner v. State, 2015 MT 348N, ¶¶ 14–15 
(Mont. 2015) (applying the two-prong test of 
Strickland to determine that counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to file a notice of 
appeal); People v. Miller, 784 N.Y.S.2d 680, 
681–82 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (“Where, as 
here, a defendant makes an informed and 
intelligent waiver of the right to appeal, 
ordinarily he or she will be precluded from 
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, 
except to the extent that the claimed 
ineffective assistance impacts upon the 
voluntariness of the plea.”); Stewart v. United 
States, 37 A.3d 870, 877 (D.C. Ct. App. 
2012) (holding Flores-Ortega did not control 
when there had been an appeal waiver, and 
stating that “[defendant’s] claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to 
the failure to file a notice of appeal is 
palpably incredible . . . .”); Kargus v. State, 
169 P.3d 307, 320 (Kan. 2007) (citing Kan. 
Admin. Regs. § 105-3-9) (applying a 
modified adaptation of Flores-Ortega, 
however, it is limited by statutory language 
stating an attorney must “file notice of appeal 
in a timely manner, unless a waiver of the 
right to appeal has been signed by the 
defendant”).  
 
In a recent case, this Court discussed 
Flores-Ortega in the context of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim when counsel did 
not consult with a defendant about filing an 
appeal after the defendant waived his right to 
appeal. McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286, 
__, 396 P.3d 1168, 1171–72 (2017). In 
McKinney, a defendant waived his right to 
appeal as part of a Rule 11 sentencing 
agreement, and then sought post-conviction 
relief on the ground that his attorney was 
ineffective for not consulting with him about 
appealing his sentence, despite having 
waived his appeal rights in the plea. Id. at __, 
396 P.3d at 1179. This Court interpreted 
Flores-Ortega to not compel a bright-line 
presumption of deficiency or prejudice in the 
failure to consult context. Id. Rather, this 
Court considered whether counsel’s failure to 
consult with the defendant about filing an 
appeal was deficient conduct that prejudiced 
the defendant, and concluded it was not. Id. 
 
In this case, we decline to presume 
counsel ineffective for failing to appeal at 
Garza’s request when Garza has waived the 
right to appeal as part of a plea agreement. 
Rather, to show ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Garza must show deficient conduct 
and resulting prejudice. In so holding, we 
conclude that Flores-Ortega does not require 
counsel be presumed ineffective for failing to 
appeal at the client’s direction in situations 
where there has been a waiver of the right to 
appeal, as there was here. 
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The Flores-Ortega Court made clear 
that a presumption of prejudice applies in the 
context of an ineffectiveness claim because 
an attorney’s deficient performance deprives 
the defendant of his or her opportunity for an 
appellate proceeding. Notably, Flores-
Ortega did not address whether this principle 
has any force, let alone controls, where the 
defendant has waived his right to appellate 
and collateral review. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 240 
(citations omitted). In fact, the Court in 
Flores-Ortega stated, “The even more 
serious denial of the entire judicial 
proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted 
at the time and to which he had a right, 
similarly demands a presumption of 
prejudice.” 528 U.S. at 483 (emphasis 
added). Once a defendant has waived his 
right to appeal in a valid plea agreement, he 
no longer has a right to such an appeal. Thus, 
the presumption of prejudice articulated in 
Flores-Ortega would not apply after a 
defendant has waived his appellate rights. 
Therefore, an attorney who declines to file 
the appeal when there has been a waiver will 
not be presumed ineffective, nor will the 
attorney be found to have violated the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
This approach is consistent with other 
areas of Idaho law. Idaho courts do not 
presume a defendant is prejudiced when an 
attorney fails to follow his client’s instruction 
to file a Rule 35 motion, despite the client 
having the right to do so. Hassett v. State, 127 
Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
 
[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel an applicant . . . must 
show both that counsel’s performance was 
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced 
the applicant. Where the alleged deficiency is 
counsel’s failure to file a . . . motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would 
not have been granted, is generally 
determinative of both prongs of the test. If the 
motion lacked merit and would have been 
denied, counsel ordinarily would not be 
deficient for failing to pursue it, and, 
concomitantly, the petitioner could not have 
been prejudiced by the want of its pursuit. Id. 
(quoting Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158–
59, 857 P.2d 634, 637–38 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
As the district court correctly stated, “[i]t 
would seem anomalous to presume prejudice 
in the failure-to-appeal context when the 
defendant waived the right to appeal, yet not 
presume prejudice in the Rule 35 context 
even when the defendant has not waived the 
right to file a Rule 35 motion.” Other Idaho 
cases have adopted similar policies regarding 
when counsel is ineffective: 
 
When considering whether an 
attorney’s failure to file or pursue a motion to 
suppress or strike evidence constitutes 
incompetent performance, the court is 
required to examine the probability of 
success of such a motion in order to 
determine whether counsel’s decision against 
pressing the motion was within the wide 
range of permissible discretion and sound 
trial strategy. In Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 
788, 794-795, 702 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1985), 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that counsel’s 
failure to move to suppress the defendant’s 
confession constituted ineffective assistance 
because it was obvious that the confession 
would have been suppressed. In Maxfield v. 
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State, 108 Idaho 493, 501, 700 P.2d 115, 123 
(Ct. App. 1985), we held that newly 
appointed counsel’s failure to renew a motion 
to suppress was not deficient, since previous 
counsel had been unsuccessful on the same 
motion and no new grounds existed. Because 
it was clear that the new motion would have 
been denied as well, counsel’s failure to make 
the motion was not deficient. See also, Davis 
v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct. App. 1989), (counsel’s failure to 
timely file a motion to suppress evidence 
seized from defendant’s home was not 
deficient because defendant had failed to 
show that the items would have been 
suppressed); State v. Youngblood, 117 Idaho 
160, 165, 786 P.2d 551, 556 (1990) (failure 
to move to suppress items seized was not 
error where items were obviously subject to 
plain view exception to exclusionary rule); 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 56, 813 P.2d 
857, 867 (1991) (failure of counsel to object 
to inadmissible opinion testimony was 
ineffective assistance.) Huck, 124 Idaho at 
158, 857 P.2d at 637. While the above cases 
do not deal with appeal waivers specifically, 
they show the policy of this Court to not 
presume counsel ineffective automatically 
when counsel exercises judgment in 
declining to file a motion where it would 
obviously be denied, or where the motion had 
previously been unsuccessful. See Davis, 116 
Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248.  
 
Moreover, a criminal defense 
attorney has a duty to the judicial system to 
exercise professional judgment and not file 
frivolous litigation, “and an appeal in the 
teeth of a valid waiver is frivolous.” Nunez, 
546 F.3d at 455; See also Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct 3.1. The defendant, 
even if allowed his appeal, will very likely 
still have his appeal dismissed as a result of 
the waiver, and “[t]here is no point in a 
constitutional rule that would yield an 
exercise in futility.” Nunez, 546 F.3d at 456. 
Garza’s attorney chose to exercise 
professional judgment and uphold the plea 
agreements that contained his client’s 
original desire to waive his right to appeal. 
Such an exercise of judgment that keeps 
frivolous and futile litigation out of the courts 
will not be presumed ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  
 
Additionally, a plea agreement is a 
bilateral contract, to which both the State and 
defendant are bound. McKinney, 162 Idaho at 
__, 396 P.3d at 1178. Once a defendant has 
accepted the plea, he should be bound by the 
waiver therein. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 455. 
“Empty promises are worthless promises; if 
defendants could retract their waivers . . . 
then they could not obtain concessions by 
promising not to appeal.” United States v. 
Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995). 
“[Garza] exchanged the right to appeal for 
prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have his 
cake and eat it too.” Id. Moreover, a lawyer 
has a duty to avoid taking actions that will 
cost their client the benefit of the plea 
bargain. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 455. If an 
attorney files an appeal despite a waiver in 
the plea agreement, the agreement may be 
breached, and the State may now be entitled 
to disregard the plea in its entirety. Here, 
filing an appeal would have been a direct 
violation of the plea agreement, and the State 
would have been free to revoke the benefits 
of the plea given to Garza. When Garza’s 
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attorney declined to file an appeal because 
the right to appeal had been waived, counsel 
ensured Garza would not be in breach of the 
plea. We are cognizant that there are 
conceivable situations where a defendant 
who has waived his right to appeal as part of 
a plea agreement may still seek to challenge 
his conviction or sentence, for example if he 
is sentenced illegally or the State breaches the 
plea agreement. This is properly done in a 
petition for post-conviction relief or writ of 
habeas corpus, rather than on direct appeal. 
 
In this case, we decline to presume 
Garza’s counsel ineffective when counsel 
failed to file an appeal at Garza’s request 
because of the appeal waiver. Rather, to show 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
appeal in light of the waiver, Garza needed to 
show both deficient performance and 
resulting prejudice. The district court 
concluded that Garza was unable to show any 
non-frivolous grounds for appeal, and 
therefore could not show prejudice. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 
dismissal of Garza’s petitions for post-
conviction relief 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the district court’s 
dismissal of Garza’s petitions for post-
conviction relief. This Court does not 
presume counsel to be automatically 
ineffective when counsel declines to file an 
appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, a 
defendant needs to show deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice to prove 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because 
Garza cannot show such grounds, his 
petitions for post-conviction relief were 
properly dismissed by the district court, and 
the district court is affirmed.  
 
Justices JONES, HORTON, BRODY and 
TROUT, Pro Tem, CONCUR. 
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 “Clients, Lawyers, and Appeals” 
 
Crime and Consequences Blog 
 
Kent Scheidegger 
 
June 18, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court today took 
up Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, involving 
the intersection of two recurring themes: 
lawyer decisions v. client decisions in the 
conduct of a case and how to apply rules 
developed for trials to the context of plea-
bargained cases, which most cases are now. 
In the course of a criminal trial, the lawyer 
makes most of the decisions, but a few are 
reserved for the client personally.  Whether 
to appeal is a client 
decision.  In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
470 (2000), the Court dealt with the issue of 
ineffective assistance claims for a lawyer's 
failure to appeal, with or without consulting 
the client.  If the lawyer is found to have 
performed deficiently, the "prejudice" 
question is only whether there is a reasonable 
probability the client would have appealed, 
not that he would have prevailed on appeal. 
 
The wrinkle in the Garza case is that the 
defendant pleaded guilty and waived his right 
to appeal as part of the bargain.  From the 
Brief in Opposition: 
 
Garza pleaded guilty to aggravated assault 
and possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver pursuant to plea agreements 
with the State of Idaho. Pet. App. 2a. As part 
of those plea agreements the district court 
bound itself to follow certain "bargained for" 
sentencing recommendations. Pet. App. 28a-
29a. Garza also waived his right to appeal and 
his right to seek a reduction of his sentences 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Pet. App. 2a-
3a. The district court imposed the agreed-
upon sentences. Pet. App. 29a. Garza 
requested his trial counsel to file a notice of 
appeal but, in light of the waiver, his counsel 
declined. Pet. App. 29a. 
 
It seems to me that the situation here is quite 
different from Flores-Ortega.  In that case, 
the lawyer's allegedly ineffective failure to 
file an appeal denied the client an entire 
judicial proceeding that he was entitled 
to.  The Court relied heavily on the 
distinction between a claim that a proceeding 
was conducted unfairly and a claim that a 
proceeding did not happen at all.  In this case, 
the proceeding was one that the client 
voluntarily gave up in return for a reduced 
sentence.  The proceeding not happening at 
all was precisely what he agreed to, and a 
finding that he had no right to it is quite 
different from a finding that he would not 
have prevailed in it. 
 
 
 
 
“Justice to Resolve Circuit Split Over Appeal Waivers” 
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Courthouse News Service 
 
Dan McCue 
 
June 18, 2018 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to resolve a split amount the circuit courts on 
the question of when an inmate has a right to 
file an appeal of his conviction despite the 
fact his plea agreement specifically waives 
that right. 
 
The case comes to the court from Idaho, 
where in early 2015 petitioner Gilberto Garza 
Jr. entered an Alford plea to aggravated 
assault and a guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance. (An Alford plea is a 
guilty plea in which the defendant maintains 
his innocence of a crime, but nevertheless 
concedes prosecutors have enough evidence 
to prove he is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.) 
 
Both plea agreements included a provision 
specifying that Garza waited his right to 
appeal. 
At a joint sentencing hearing, the district 
court accepted both plea agreements, 
acknowledged the appeal waiver, but went on 
to advise Garza of his right to appeal and his 
right to be appointed counsel if he did so. 
Later, Garza filed a pro se petition for 
postconviction relief, asserting he repeatedly 
instructed his trial counsel to file a notice of 
appeal on his behalf, but that the lawyer 
failed to do so. He said this failure was proof 
he received ineffective counsel in his case. 
Garza’s attorney acknowledged he declined 
to file an appeal on his client’s behalf, but 
said he explained that the waiver the inmate 
had agreed to made an appeal problematic. 
For its part, the government said if Garza still 
wanted to press his case, he was required to 
show actual prejudice from the loss of a 
chance to appeal his case. 
Every federal circuit has weighed in on the 
issue presented in the case. In doing so, eight 
circuits have adopted the “presumption of 
prejudice” set forth by the Supreme Court in 
the 2000 case Roe v. Flores-Ortega, but two 
circuits have deferred, requiring a showing of 
actual prejudice. 
 
The district court adopted the view of the 
minority of circuits and denied Garza’s 
appeal, although it noted there is a split 
among the circuits that the Supreme Court 
had not resolved. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
and state Supreme Court later affirmed the 
ruling. 
In a petition for a writ of certiorari filed on 
Garza’s behalf, Amir Ali of the Roderick & 
Solance and the MaCarthur Justice Center in 
Washington, D.C., says these decisions were 
“wrong and troubling.” 
“While a plea waiver may substantially limit 
the scope of issues available to a defendant if 
he chooses to appeal, even the broadest 
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waiver leaves open a number of significant 
issues, including those going to voluntariness 
or competence to enter the plea, ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the plea process, 
and the legality of the sentence imposed,” Ali 
write. “Where trial counsel refuses a criminal 
defendant’s instruction to file a notice of 
appeal, counsel thus deprives the defendant 
of a counseled direct appeal on these issues 
“altogether.” 
As is their custom, the justices did not explain 
their rational for taking up the case on 
Monday.
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The case is Markle Interests LLC et al. v. 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service et al., case 
number 14-31008, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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